I claim that the proposition that the status of X is unknowable in principle is equivalent to the proposition that X has no real world consequences. A theory with no real world consequences is comparable to the suggestion that somewhere out there the prime numbers 17 and 23 are engaged in a dispute about which is more important.

I further claim that the proposition that X has no real world consequences is practically indistinguishable from the proposition that X does not exist.

Finally I claim that the proposition that X has no real world consequences implies that all rational arguments concerning X are per se insupportable. If X has no possible relationship to anything we can have knowledge or experience of – not even in principle, all arguments concerning it are invalid.

Given the fact that the whole field of philosophy is based on the idea that the persuasiveness of philosophical argument extends somewhere beyond sophistry, I consider the claim that anything with real world consequences may be unknowable in principle to be rather dubious. Likewise the claim that anything unknowable in principle may have real world consequences.

I was looking for Kent (MD)’s latest post and came upon this. 61 comments in (wow)…I skimmed at best. But I came across this and found it interesting and somewhat relevant to the line of thought being developed here:

Economist.com

But your last part more or less gets it right. If it is unknowable then it’s at best problematic to focus in on. Therefore I think one should adopt a revisionist account of free will and responsibility that doesn’t depend upon an ontological rejection of “chance.”

I disagree with the verificationist position on what legitimately constitutes knowledge. However, for our purposes, what constitutes knowledge is irrelevant. What is important is what constitutes truth.

Of course in principle there could be abstract entities whose existence has no real world consequences. The truth of the existence of such entities would not be tautological, but it would be trivial.

Your hypothesis is that ALFW has no real world consequences. If ALFW has no real world consequences, then the truth of ALFW is immaterial, not worth bothering about, no more than an entertaining diversion, a resource sink for frenzied minds. Not technically meaningless, but virtually meaningless – the substance behind the common caricature of philosophy and metaphysics as much ado about next to nothing.

(I’d also say I’m not a positivist, so I don’t think saying something has no real world consequences is meaningless)

The proposition anything that is universally true is inherently unknowable is virtually a contradiction in terms. Non-tautological universal truths have real world consequences. Universal real world consequences are knowable in principle.

Your argument that ALFW (if it exists) does not have knowable real world consequences is essentially the same as saying that ALFW is a meaningless proposition. I can’t agree with that.

Because your (Mele’s) argument is cogent against event-causal theories and not against agent-causal theories. I have given at least a half-dozen ways in which God could know whether a state of affairs or an event is the result of an exercise of agent-causal power (in #47, 48 and 49). You ignore these ways. We may not be in an epistemic position to verify the difference (at least currently), but that is hardly telling unless you’re looking for an empirical argument.