“I think any viable version of Mormon materialism requires property dualism of some sort, i.e. at least something out there with what I call “micro-mental” (non-ordinary) properties.”

I have always thought that the materialism which Joseph Smith seemed to avocate probably included something more than mere matter/spirit matter in motion. However, I have never thought that any of the Libertarian Free Will mumbo jumbo had anything to do with it. To state it more clearly, I think one can argue from property dualism to LFW within a Mormon context, but I think an argument from LFW to property dualism is a dead end.

Dennett’s basic strategy, and mine isn’t far off either, is that he takes both moral responsibility and the scientific worldview as basic premises and then shows how the most common arguments against their compatibility don’t work. It’s true, he doesn’t show very well HOW they are compatible together, but I think he shows pretty well that arguments against their compatibility aren’t very good.

So I guess it kind of comes down to a burden of proof sort of thing. I accept both the existence of free will/responsibility AND materialism/determinism and think the burden of proof lies on anybody who think these two can’t coexist. Geoff and Blake, however, don’t think that REAL free will/responsibility can coexist with determinism (and perhaps materialism) and think the burden of proof lies on those who need to show how they can coexist.

Thus never convince each other. They have never given me any good reasons to think that they can’t coexist and I’ve never shown them very well how they can coexist.

The main reason for that is nothing constructed out of ordinary matter (as we understand it) can have libertarian free will, and I maintain the latter is necessary not only to ground moral responsibility, but also for anything to happen for a reason.

The alternative point of view is essentially that rationality, free will, creativity, intent, the first person perspective, etc, are all epiphenomena.

So sure, if you believe that an ordinary computer is or can be “alive”, and exhibit real intent, responsibility, free will, creativity, and so on, then this doesn’t appear to be much of a mystery.

The problem for the hard materialist version of Mormon materialism, is that not only does anything ever occur for a reason, but the whole plan of salvation is brought into question.

For example, “Men are that they might have joy”. That is not exactly a statement of cosmic significance if joy is epiphenomenal. “Wickedness never was happiness?” Same deal.

That is why I conclude that a hard materialist world is a world stripped of anything of any conceivable value, meaning, or purpose.

Regarding his conclusions about moral responsibility, I think he was dealing with a few of the necessary conditions for such rather than any sufficient condition which, you are right, he did leave out.

I think he was primarily concerned with prying apart determined and inevitable as well as causation and competence as far as these concept get thrown around in the free will debates.

While I don’t think he gave any knock down arguments for compatibilism, I think he did dispense nicely with some of the more popular arguments against compatibilism.

Yeah, Dennett takes the “scientific worldview” of materialism for granted. I always saw this as being roughly analogous to Mormon materialism, but I can see how some might disagree with that. Perhaps you could spell out what more you think there is to a person and how that something makes any difference at all.

Geoff,
I think by “designed” he simply meant that an agent has functions/teleology as part of its constitution. I don’t think much of what he says hangs on something having a definite beginning or anything like that.

Regarding first causes and the like, my impression is that he doesn’t find such questions to be very interesting or clear. He has very tentative theories about how the universe might have come into existence, but I think that he would officially call himself agnostic on the matter.

Those are assertions that need to be proved, or at least defended with respect to the alternatives.

The problem I have listening to folks like Dennett, and half the more outspoken scientists in the world generally, is they sound so much like philosophical philistines. There is no problem here, look the other way.

I’m watching now. At about the 32 minute mark Dennett defines an agent as something that is finite and designed. He does not take into the account Mormon view that an agent can be finite, simple, and beginningless (therefore undesigned).

In fact it seems to me that Dennett ignores the questions of firsts in existence. In your readings of him do you know if he assumes there is a first cause?

Just came across a somewhat recent video lecture (by Dennett, of course) about free will and determinism. Thought it went over a lot of the points we’ve been over, only a little more clearly than we did, in my opinion.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5cSgVgrC-6Y&feature=related