We all agree that God isn’t the cause of evil because he is good. When your view entails that God is accountable for evil, it follows on both of our views that the being we are talking about isn’t God. You attempt to escape the clear implications of your Calvinism by attempting to say that if it follows from what you believe in your belief-system then it cannot be objectionable is just non-sense. For example, if I show that materialistic naturalism entails epiphenomenalism (and I believe that it does) and I show that epiphenomenalism just isn’t an acceptable view, then I have shown an aporia and deep problem in the beginning assumptions of the entire enterprise. When it is shown that God is responsible for evil and arbitrary predestination, and that such implications are inconsistent with the fundamental Christian commitment that God is loving, then it follows that I have shown that the entire system of Calvinism is called seriously into question. It is incoherent. It gives us an unworthy view of God and in fact a view of a being that cannot really be called God consistently. Attempting to avoid this conclusion by asserting that it just follows from the entire belief system is hardly an answer. It is to recognize that one’s views have been reduced to absurdity but to suggest that it isn’t absurd because the absurdity follows from other beliefs in the belief system. But that is just the point of a reductio ad absurdum argument. It’s like seeing that the system is incoherent but suggesting that isn’t a problem because the incoherence follows from the belief system as a whole.

First off, I believe that I have shown that what you claim is “natural culpability” just ain’t culpability at all. We can disapprove of natural states that are not culpable.

Further, when I assert that Calvinism asserts that moral culpability can be transferred, I am clearly referring to the kind of culpability for which we can be held accountable and punished — and only moral culpability will do the job. In fact, to be clear what I assert that is that God is really opposed only to his own sovereign and arbitrary judgment as to what is disagreeable to him — God imputes sinfulness to us just as much as he imputes Christ’s righteousness to us. It is all purely arbitrary in the Calvinist view.

So I am asserting something quite consistent: Calvinism wants to say that we are not morally accountable for original sin, but merely for the effects that follow from it. However, when Calvinism asserts that we all deserve to be damned so that God does us no injustice when he leaves some to damnation, only the category of moral culpability can justify this claim. What you call “natural culpability” cannot justify punishment or damnation. In fact, I claim that it is just conceptually vacuous. So while I acknowledge that Calvinism wants to fob off some non-moral notion of original sin — and in fact does when it is discovered that good and evil are purely arbitrary because they are whatever God deems them to be with no real meaning — only moral culpability can do the job that Calvinists want original sin to do.

You have to read the entire chapter and not proof-text it the way you have done. I am loathe to read the entire thing for you or to reproduce it here just to show that what I am saying is what I have been saying all along. But read the definition of Calvinist original sin on p. 123 and what I say about imputed guilt and righteousness on pp. 358-59.

You state:

Look, let’s get something straight. I have not asserted that Calvin or Calvinists claimed that people are morally responsible for original sin; what I claimed is that only moral responsibility can justify punishment and blameworthiness.

This is not what you claim. Look, you clearly state in your book that

The traditional doctrine of original sin adopts the untenable view that moral culpability can be transferred from one person to another. (POT 121)

But this is not the traditional view of original sin and certainly not what Calvin had in mind. Rather, the traditional doctrine of original sin agrees that moral culpability cannot be transferred, but claims that natural culpability can.

You further claim in your book that

Calvinism violates both (MP) and (MPC). Not only are we [morally] guilty of Adam’s, but we all deserve eternal damnation from birth as a result. Thus, we are not only [morally] guilty for Adam’s sin but can be justly punished for an act done by another. (POT 126)

Both (MP) and (MPC) have to do with moral accountability. You are now offering a new principle. Let’s call it the justified punishment principle, which states:

(JP) Only moral responsibility can justify punishment and blameworthiness.

From this principle you can now argue that Calvinism violates (JP) and, thus, is unacceptable. But this is an entirely different argument than what you present in your book; for (JP) and (MP)/(MPC) do not mean the same thing. Calvin and Calvinist can and do accept both (MP) and (MPC), but they cannot accept (JP).

Perhaps a third party can weigh in here:

In his book, does Blake argue that

(a) DOS is untenable because it violates the principle that one person cannot be morally accountable for the actions of another person

or

b) DOS is untenable because it violates the principle that only moral responsibility can justify punishment?

As I read it, you argue for (a). And I suppose that’s why you call it the problem of “vicarious guilt” (which BTW is quite catchy) rather than the problem of “confused categories” (which is plain and boring).

You state:

So what I claim is that Calvinists attempt to deal with original sin as a non-moral category of natural defectiveness, but only morally significant acts can justify desert and damnation for original sin. It is the same mistake you make over and over again by failing to see where moral culpability is required and not merely a natural defect. You just aren’t getting it.

You may claim this now, but this is not the argument you present in your book. And, yes, I am getting it. I just disagree. You state that only immoral acts can justify punishment of any sort. But I claim that if God is the law maker then he can justifiably punish anything he wants. You may think that this is absurd, but there are plenty of rational people who have and still do disagreed with you.

You state that

if what follows [from an idea] is absurdity, then you have begun with something that ought to be rejected.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that this is true. Tell me how you decide whether something is absurd or rational. And once you give me the criteria for something being absurd or rational, tell me how it is that the idea of God being the moral law maker fits that criteria. Then tell why I should care about being rational or absurd in that way.

As far as I know, there is no widely accepted concept of absurdity or rationality (and even if there were, it would not follow that it was right). Rather these concepts seem to reflect and only reflect what a community is willing to accept and reject. Thus, if a community accepts God as the moral law maker then it is rational for that community. If a community rejects it then it is absurd for that community. Now, this does not prove that there is no absolute sense of these concepts. But I don’t know what they are and, thus, cannot judge whether something is absolutely absurd or not. I have to allow for the possibility that it may only seem absurd to me b/c of my historical and cultural context.

The only meaning I can understand of this term is “deserving of someone’s (ours, God’s, aliens’, etc.) disapproval”.

Calvin, of course, denies libertarian free-will and consequently must maintain that moral culpability is compatible with determinism.

It’s coming into focus for me now. I agree that if you reject libertarian free will you are forced to strip moral culpability down to a matter of disapproval. Nothing in theology really makes any sense to me after that, which explains why your view makes no sense to me. But at least I think I get what you are saying.

By the way, since you seem to have asked, but I didn’t see an answer, Blake the commenter is the same as Ostler in the post.

So what I claim is that Calvinists attempt to deal with original sin as a non-moral category of natural defectiveness, but only morally significant acts can justify desert and damnation for original sin. It is the same mistake you make over and over again by failing to see where moral culpability is required and not merely a natural defect. You just aren’t getting it.

If God makes the rules then if he wanted to do this then it would be just. Sure your principle makes sense intuitively, but intuition is a cheap mistress. Many before Copernicus would have said that intuition tells us that the sun revolves around the earth. Intuition has lead us astray many, many times before and there is no reason to trust her here. It is no contradiction to say that “God is the moral law maker” and, thus, it is logically possible.

This claim is multiply flawed. First, your argument simply begs the question by assuming that if you believe something and something else follows from it, then it must be fine to believe whatever follows. However, if what follows is absurdity, then you have begun with something that ought to be rejected — like the view that God causes everything and therefore is responsible for evil. Simply because it that God is responsible for all evil if we begin with God causing everything, it doesn’t make it OK that God is responsible for evil!

Would you allow air pollution into your utopia? I wouldn’t. But why? What has air pollution ever done to deserve this banishment? Nothing. Rather, it is banished merely because of what it is.

Duhh. Of course I would banish air pollution in my utopia. But I wouldn’t blame the air pollution for being morally culpable for being something that is a defect. I would blame God who caused it.

Culpable to whom? Culpability seems to imply that there is somebody to whom one is culpable. Again this just assumes that voluntarism is wrong. And I see no reason to think that is the case.

Nonsense. One can be culpable without owing duties to another. God could be culpable for failing to make something less that the best that he could make because if he is really perfectly good then what he makes must also be perfectly good! Further, God is unfair to all those whom he damns that he could save because he is unfair and unloving to them to damn them arbitrarily when he just as easily save them all at will. He wrongs all those whom he creates defective that he could have created non-defective.

You state:

I assert that no person can be morally blameworthy . . . for what another did.

Yes, I know that this is what you assert and in doing so you misrepresent Calvin and Calvinism; for this is not what Calvin maintains — as I have demonstrated. If you have a quote from Calvin where he states that some person can be morally blameworthy for what another did then by all means provide it.

You also state:

I assert that no person can be . . . justly held morally accountable for what another did.

Again, Calvin never claimed this. Rather he states that everybody is held accountable for and only for what they do and for what they are. If you have a quote to the contrary provide it.

Furthermore, this claim assumes and does not demonstrate the falsity of voluntarism. If God makes the rules then if he wanted to do this then it would be just. Sure your principle makes sense intuitively, but intuition is a cheap mistress. Many before Copernicus would have said that intuition tells us that the sun revolves around the earth. Intuition has lead us astray many, many times before and there is no reason to trust her here. It is no contradiction to say that “God is the moral law maker” and, thus, it is logically possible.

You claim:

I claim that Calvinism entails that we are guilty for what God decrees and causes and we cannot do otherwise and that is a deficient view.

Calvin, of course, denies libertarian free-will and consequently must maintain that moral culpability is compatible with determinism. But this issue is entirely separate from the doctrine of original sin, which states that we are naturally culpable.

You stated:

Calvin most certainly held that babies can be justly punished in the sense that they deserve hell for original sin. So I ask again, What has the baby done to be blameworthy for anything?

The infant has not done anything. But of course this is the point. The infant is not morally culpable, but naturally culpable.

You:

you fail to take into account that Calvinism holds us accountable for what we don’t do.

Yes, but not morally accountable. Try this thought experiment. Suppose that cancer were a conscious entity. Suppose further that it is completely unaware that it destroys human life. Can we hold it morally accountable for destroying us? Let’s just assume the answer is no. Does this mean that we should invite it into our body? Of course the answer here is no. Should we still try to destroy it if it takes hold in our body? Of course the answer here is yes. But what has the cancer done to deserve this? Nothing. Couldn’t it ask us “How can you justly condemn me for only being what I am?” Isn’t the answer to this because it is inimical to our flourishing and we matter more than it? We destroy it and hold it accountable b/c of its nature. Are we unjust for doing so? No; for cancer is naturally culpable to us.

This seems to me to be similar to what Calvin is saying. Human nature left in its vitiated state is like cancer. If allowed into God’s glorified body (i.e., heaven) without being regenerated, it would destroy it. So God does not and will not let this happen. Is God unjust for doing so? No; for we in our vitiated state are naturally culpable to him.

You state:

I disapprove of air pollution. Will you say that air pollution is therefore blameworthy or culpable for the fact that it obtains?

Would you allow air pollution into your utopia? I wouldn’t. But why? What has air pollution ever done to deserve this banishment? Nothing. Rather, it is banished merely because of what it is.

You state:

Further, you assert: But it is no argument against some position to point out its consequences. If you were correct, then the argument ad absurdum would have no bite.

And? What follows from this? That reductio ad absurdum arguments do have bite? How? Why can’t I just accept that they don’t. Indeed, I do. Reductios demonstrate nothing other than the psychological leanings of the person(s) using them. Does any contradiction follow from denying reductio ad absurdums as a valid form of reasoning? No.

You state:

The fact that Calvinism entails that God is directly responsible for everything that occurs, as you admit, entails that God is culpable for anything of which you assert God disapproves and also for any moral evil.

Culpable to whom? Culpability seems to imply that there is somebody to whom one is culpable. Again this just assumes that voluntarism is wrong. And I see no reason to think that is the case.

I am not usually this direct. Your assertions here are misleading and misrepresentations of Calvinism because you fail to take into account that Calvinism holds us accountable for what we don’t do.

Here is how I prove that you account of culpability simply misses the boat and drifts at sea drowning. You assert that to be culpable just means “deserving of disapproval.” Such a view demonstrates precisely how you fail to grasp the moral nature of blameworthiness such that a person could be held accountable and thus justly punished. I disapprove of air pollution. Will you say that air pollution is therefore blameworthy or culpable for the fact that it obtains? It is not enough for moral culpability merely that we disapprove of something (Galen Strawson’s redefinition of moral accountability), we must be justly held accountable and blameworthy in a moral sense.

Further, you assert: But it is no argument against some position to point out its consequences. If you were correct, then the argument ad absurdum would have no bite. The fact that Calvinism entails that God is directly responsible for everything that occurs, as you admit, entails that God is culpable for anything of which you assert God disapproves and also for any moral evil. It entails, in other words, that the being you assert is God ain’t. That is a pretty damning indictment of a view that follows from pointing out what follows!

You stated:

Look, the infant is just as God created it according to Calvin. If there is any culpability, it is God’s.

However, unless you are interested in burning only straw men, this not Calvin’s nor any educated Calvinist’s position. As Calvin states:

Now away with those persons who dare write God’s name upon their faults . . . Our destruction . . . comes from the guilt of our flesh, not from God, inasmuch as we have perished solely because we have degenerated from out original condition .

[W]e declare that man is corrupted through natural vitiation . . . we call it ‘natural’ in order that no man may think that anyone obtains it through bad conduct, since it holds all men fast by hereditary right. . . . How could God, who is pleased by the least of his works, have been hostile to the noblest of all his creatures? But he is hostile toward the corruption of his work rather than toward the work itself . Therefore, if it is right to declare that mean, because of his vitiated nature, is naturally abominable to God, it is also proper to say that man is naturally depraved and faulty. (Institutes 2.1.10-11)

So, pace your claim, Calvin did not teach that everything is as God created it. Quite the contrary! Our nature has been vitiated. It may be that for Calvin everything is as God decreed it. But this is not the same as saying everything is as God created it . The two sentence clearly do not mean the same thing; for one may be true and the other false.

Now does this make God morally culpable? Perhaps. But I suppose that has something to do with one’s adopted moral theory. As I understand it, and as Ostler rightly points out, Calvin and many Calvinists are strong voluntarists. Ostler has made many arguments against this position (or should I say repeated the same old and tired arguments against this position). However, none of them demonstrate its falisty.

His favorite seems to be that voluntarism results in absurdities. But what is absurd to one is rational to another. He claims that if voluntarism is true, then, God could make it so that rape could be performed meritoriously. He then claims that this is absurd and, thus, so too is voluntarism. But it is no argument against some position to point out its consequences. Why could not the voluntarist respond, “Yeah, so what?” As Ockham stated: “The hatred of God, theft, adultery, and actions similar to these actions according to common law, may have an evil quality annexed.” The argument has no sting for those who are prepared to accept the consequences.

Another of his favorites is to point out that if voluntarism is true, then, morality is arbitrary. But that is absurd. Therefore, so too is voluntarism. But again, it is no argument against a position to point out its consequences. Why cannot the voluntarist again say, “Yeah, so what?” What follows from morality being arbitrary? Nothing other than it is arbitrary. One may not like this idea. But one’s likes and dislikes have nothing to do with the truth of an idea.

So, to argue that it is absurd or unjust that God could damn an infant to hell merely for having a nature that is displeasing to him, especially since God decreed that the baby have such a nature, assumes the falsity of voluntarism, which in no way has been demonstrated by Ostler (or anybody else for that matter). It’s just out of favor these days. Although, the argument with the best chance of disproving the thesis is the argument from tautology. But if my distinction b/t natural and moral culpability holds then even this argument fails.

You also state:

Why use the term “culpability” at all? In all due candor, it seems that this distinction is comparing apples and oranges. The problem is that Calvinists assert that there is somehow blameworthiness for such non-moral culpability and thus confuse moral with non-moral terms by making us morally blameworthy for non-moral facts for which we are not accountable but God is.

I ask you what is blameworthiness or culpability? The only meaning I can understand of this term is “deserving of someone’s (ours, God’s, aliens’, etc.) disapproval”. And if we give it that meaning then to say that something is naturally blameworthy or culpable makes sense; for to be naturally culpable is just to have some feature that deserves our disapproval.

I suppose my distinction has something in common the the now common distinction made between moral and natural evil. Moral evils are those acts performed by humans that deserve our disapproval b/c they are inherently deleterious to our flourishing. And natural evils are those natural events that b/c of some feature they have are inherently deleterious to human flourishing. If we are will to say that this distinction makes sense, then, why not my distinction b/t moral and natural culpability. It seems to me that all evil is worthy or deserving of our disapproval. And, thus, both moral and natural evil seem to be worthy of our disapproval, which is only to say that they are both blameworthy.

Lastly you ask:

Do you maintain that infants can be justly damned for what you call natural culpability?

I maintain nothing of the sort. Yet I do not deny it either. Rather I only maintain that Ostler’s (your?) argument does not demonstrate that they aren’t or cannot be. I also maintain that your argument against original sin is a straw man and not what Calvin or educated Calvinists maintain. This I believe I have demonstrated.

Equally importantly, what you call natural culpability is just not culpability in any recognizable sense. The infant is disordered according to Calvin. Further, Jacob isn’t saying that God actually disapproves of our make-up, only that what you are saying seems to entail such a view that really doesn’t deal with culpability at all. Tell me how an infant could deserve or be justly damned to hell for an eternity in light of what you call natural culpability? How is God not directly responsible for the infant’s make-up? If the infant is somehow disordered, then what has that got to do with “culpability” which is an inherently moral category? Why use the term “culpability” at all? In all due candor, it seems that this distinction is comparing apples and oranges. The problem is that Calvinists assert that there is somehow blameworthiness for such non-moral culpability and thus confuse moral with non-moral terms by making us morally blameworthy for non-moral facts for which we are not accountable but God is. Do you maintain that infants can be justly damned for what you call natural culpability?