Libertarianism Part Deux
The discussion on my last post veered into a highly technical philosophy of mind debate so I wanted to pick up the core issue again here.
My take on the debate so far is that the Mormon compatibilists were left in an extremely tough spot. One of their main arguments was that we don’t understand how libertarian free will works so it must not exist. But Blake proposed a emergentist theory of how it might work and none of the compatibilists had any ammo to shoot that theory down. (And even if Blake’s theory does not prove to be the final reality behind LFW, not knowing how something works is hardly a powerful argument that it must not exist.)
But the Mormon compatibilists were left with a much bigger problem on their hands. They have not been able to show how anyone could be held morally responsible for any thoughts, words, or deeds in the fully deterministic universe they propose. Adam and JNS had proposed a universe where our spirits, complete with a “nub of character”, are beginningless. Now beginningless spirits are easy to defend in Mormonism but this idea of a beginningless “nub of character” is what causes their theory to crash. The problem is that they hold that this nub of character is “who we are” and we can never change it — not through the atonement or through repentance or anything. So while that might explain exhaustive foreknowledge via the fixed future it creates, it also make the ultimate fate of every human being pre-determined and predestined (in the broad sense of the term). Most importantly, it obliterates the common notions of repentance in Mormonism.
Mark D. also pointed out that in some ways this Mormon determinism is worse than creedal Christian variations of predestination. In Calvinistic versions of predestination at least there is some divine reasoning behind some people being predestined for hell and other predestined for heaven (as hideous as that notion is to me). In the Mormon determinist version the unchangeable and predetermined fate of each person seems to be left entire to chance. Yuck.
Anyway, here is the chance for Adam, JNS, Clark, Stapley, or any other opponents of libertarianism to show us Mormon libertarians the error of our ways and how there possibly could be such a thing as moral responsibility if LFW is not real. (In fact I’ll let you decide if you want to be the Jets or the Sharks.) Let’s… get ready to rummmble!
The problem is that they hold that this nub of character is “who we are” and we can never change it — not through the atonement or through repentance or anything.
This is not an accurate portrayal of the position advanced by JNS or Adam on the previous thread. If I understood correctly, JNS was quite direct in saying that the “who we are” can and does change due to the influence of external forces. On this view, it is God’s job to bring about the right kind of change in each individual so that they can be saved. Of course, it seems that God’s actions are decided deterministically also, so this last idea might have problems. Nevertheless, the statement that our character could never change does not seem accurate to me.
Comment by Jacob J — July 9, 2007 @ 9:56 pm
Hmmm… I don’t think that is right Jacob. The idea as I understood it was that this “nub of character” determined the eternal spiritual trajectory of a person and thus people destined to be exalted were eternally so (as were those fated to outer darkness). I do think you are right that JNS envisions a chasm-jumping grace event for those fated to exaltation. But the only people who get this are those who were sufficiently righteous at their core from all eternity and thus had the correct trajectory to get to that chasm-jumping point. So I don’t think that detail about a chasm jump deflects my core criticism about the position at all.
We’ll see what those guys say though.
Comment by Geoff J — July 9, 2007 @ 10:05 pm
I don’t think your description of the view can be squared with comment #22 from the previous thread. Unless they show up to defend themselves, I will try to do it.
Comment by Jacob J — July 9, 2007 @ 10:23 pm
I should say that my restatement of the view in #2 is not fully accurate either. In the comment linked to above, JNS speaks of a “divine-human partnership” in changing a person’s character and says:
So, you have both external influences (”listen to the Spirit”) as well as internal influences (”a person’s innate character”) involved in this view of sanctification.
In a later comment, JNS says that “a person’s character is the ultimate cause of her free actions.” If I understand correctly, the “ultimate” part comes from the fact that even though there are external forces, the fact of whether a person listens to those external forces remains a function of the person’s character.
Now, I see significant problems with this view, but I simply don’t think it is fair to describe this position as claiming that character can never change.
Comment by Jacob J — July 9, 2007 @ 10:38 pm
Jacob,
The claim JNS (and Adam) made was that a person can never change her own character. This was verified by JNS agreeing with these two points from my list of “Cons” of compatibilism:
So JNS offered up a system where God could change some people’s character through his grace, but that system has such grace only available to the lucky ones who were not eternally bad apples. Those bad apples could never choose to be good enough apples to be saved just as the good apples are fated for salvation and could not choose otherwise (though neither group wants to choose otherwise in his system).
Comment by Geoff J — July 9, 2007 @ 10:50 pm
Geoff,
Argh. In the comment you link to, JNS said:
I know this is not the thread you hoped to start with this post, but I feel strongly about being as fair as possible about what another person said.
Comment by Jacob J — July 9, 2007 @ 11:12 pm
JNS is pretty good at hedging his bets in comments so the fact that he is “likely to agree” with #2 and #5 is enough to make my point about his stated position. I don’t know exactly what you are disagreeing with at this point. Are you saying he hasn’t claimed that we have a “nub of character” that determines our eternal destiny? Are you saying his offered compatibilist position does allow for a person to change her own character? If not then how am I still being unfair to his position?
Comment by Geoff J — July 9, 2007 @ 11:20 pm
Well, if you look at Fodor’s arguments for functionalism and Rey’s argument for eliminativism with regards to p-consciousness…
Just kidding, Geoff.
Comment by Jeff G — July 10, 2007 @ 12:22 am
“One of their main arguments was that we don’t understand how libertarian free will works so it must not exist. But Blake proposed a emergentist theory of how it might work and none of the compatibilists had any ammo to shoot that theory down.”
I don’t have any arguments because I have no clue what it is. I’ve never been able to understand Blake’s theory as being anything less than a constrained sort of dualism only by a different name. If this is the case, then there are plenty of arguments against it.
It simply seems that Blake’s theory is not a theory at all, but rather a non-theory. He doesn’t explain our choices, because they can’t be explained and to assume that they can is to beg the question against him. That’s fine to believe this, but let us not think that this is a theory of any kind at all.
As for the rest of the post, I’m reminded to Dennett’s slogan “If you make yourself really small, you can externalize everything.” This really is the issue in the case of personal responsibility. The fear is that is one accept determinism then everything that everybody does is caused by their nature/nurture rather than by them.
The problem is that that we have no reason to believe that nature/nurture is any more responsible than any person is because they too were only caused by what came before them. If we follow this reasoning in a beginning-less context (as the Mormon context is) then there is no responsibility at all. It isn’t X killed Y, and who is responsible? Not X, not his parents, or their parents or anybody at all.
This, however, is not how responsibility works. We hold people responsible for their actions if they meant to do them and that’s all there is to it. We don’t really care what caused them to mean to do it, rather we only care that they did it and that they meant to do it. The only way that a person could avoid all responsibility is by our making them really, really small so as to externalize all responsibility and we simply have no good reason to do such things.
Indeed, it is not at all difficult to imagine an argument being put forth from evolutionary game theory for the importance of holding individuals responsible for their actions rather than anybody else.
Comment by Jeff G — July 10, 2007 @ 12:40 am
Jeff,
Sorry if you can’t understand the “radical emergence” that Blake’s theory relies on. It makes sense to me. As I said in the post, not fully understanding something is no argument that it is not real. Who understands exactly how Jesus was resurrected? Nobody I know of. Yet we Mormons accept it as real and look forward to the day when we will understand such things.
If we follow this reasoning in a beginning-less context (as the Mormon context is) then there is no responsibility at all.
I am aware of this stance of yours. As I said in the last thread, I think you are dead wrong on this idea because if there were no moral responsibility in the universe then the gospel would be a sham. I also think you are dead wrong in no longer believing there is a God but I have conceded that your position is at least internally consistent.
So as much as I like you — this post isn’t aimed at you but rather to the believing Mormons who want to defend compatibilism.
Comment by Geoff J — July 10, 2007 @ 9:20 am
Jeff: What is difficult to understand about basic powers? In the last post I stated that what emerges is a basic power to unify the diverse data of experience into a whole. It is a power that we know we have because our experience is not of a zillion experiences of our cells, but a unity of experience. Further, it is clear that we cannot refer to something more basic than these basic powers that we have. However, no one balks at such basic powers when we refer to the electro-magentic properties of basic particles/waves. Unless our entire mode of explanation in physics is simply non-explanatory, then the mode of explanation I have adopted is the way we must proceed with basic powers. Further, if we had to refer to somethng external the agent to explain the acts of the agent, as JNS ends up doing, then the agent is not free and not responsible because the explanation for the action lies outside the agent. I would add that Fodor gives a similar argument about basic powers in support of emergence in the link I posted on the last thread on LFW.
I also think that you are mistaken about how we attribute resonsibility. It is uniformly shown by studies that folks will not attribute blame or responsibility where it can be shown that factors outside of the person’s control cause or result in the act being done.
Comment by Blake — July 10, 2007 @ 9:40 am
Note I’m not an opponent of libertarianism. I’m skeptical of arguments that suggest we must have libertarianism. And I’m very skeptical of false dichotomies over the choices here. But as to my personal views on the free will issue I’m pretty agnostic. I argue against determinists as much as libertarians.
Comment by Clark — July 10, 2007 @ 10:37 am
Well I have been arguing that we must have libertarianism, Clark. As was noted in that last thread, I would love to hear about any alternatives to libertarianism you might suggest. The last version I heard from you (something about our making all of our free choices at the instant of the big bang and living out the fixed fate of those choices ever since if I remember correctly) did not jibe well with the notion of repentance in this life at all. That may not actually be the position you lean toward though so if you know of any viable alternatives to libertarianism (that work within the context of the restored gospel) I’d love to hear them.
Comment by Geoff J — July 10, 2007 @ 10:45 am
Also Clark — Blake was right in the last thread when he said: “Either things are fully determined or they are not.” There is a real dichotomy at work here — not a false one. Now I have tried to allow for the closest thing to determinism without crossing the line to full determinism in the past with this veto free will idea within libertarianism. But even that is a variation on libertarianism and I contend that the gospel only works in a universe where some variation of libertarianism is true.
Comment by Geoff J — July 10, 2007 @ 11:29 am
Geoff, for the record I think causal determinism is false. I don’t think that entails libertarianism.
The position I’m favorable to although hardly committed to is the existence of a block universe but one underdetermined and that there are many block universes.
Comment by clark — July 10, 2007 @ 12:41 pm
I came into this discussion way too late last time (after 200 comments), so hopefully I can get something in that is meaningful to the discussion this time around.
I find it interesting that this debate has centered on philosophical understandings of free will and has overlooked the sociological discussions of this topic. I am generally persuaded by Pierre Bourdieu’s discussion of the habitus which explains both the regularity of human behavior in specific cultural contexts as well as the creativity and spontaneity. In his most famous example, he describes human behavior as a game soccer. The rules are stable and the boundaries are fixed, yet at any one time the players may be located in different parts of the field performing different functions. Success occurs when different players perform their functions the best, which encourages regular behavior. This gets you out of causal determinism as well by allowing for individual agency that still exists within the external constraints to agency.
I think that this example is important to consider because libertarian free will isn’t simply a logical problem, but an empirical one.
Comment by TT — July 10, 2007 @ 2:16 pm
Geoff, I think that Bourdieu’s solution also solves the problem of accountability that you are worried about. You don’t have to have LFW to have accountability because even in a system in which there are constraints, there is still agency.
Comment by TT — July 10, 2007 @ 2:18 pm
TT: You don’t have to have LFW to have accountability because even in a system in which there are constraints, there is still agency.
I don’t think so TT. Without LFW there can be no moral responsibility. That is because in the absence of LFW every present choice is caused by some prior state of affairs. Only with LFW does an agent have the legitimate ability to “choose otherwise” and only with LFW is the future not fixed.
Comment by Geoff J — July 10, 2007 @ 2:30 pm
Once again Geoff, if LFW is false, it doesn’t follow that causal determinism is true.
Comment by clark — July 10, 2007 @ 4:08 pm
I’m not sure I said otherwise in #18 Clark so I don’t know what prompted your comment.
Please explain further what you mean though. (Mostly because I suspect that any alternative to LFW you have in mind would also entail a fixed future and thus would be at odds with the restored gospel…)
Comment by Geoff J — July 10, 2007 @ 4:14 pm
TT,
LFW doesn’t imply a lack of constraints (social or otherwise). The kind of social influences you are describing from Bourdieu are definitely real. So, I think you are solving the problem of accountability the same way that Geoff and I are, which is by accepting the existence of individual agency as you mentioned.
Comment by Jacob J — July 10, 2007 @ 4:26 pm
I just want to echo this important point from Blake:
Words obtain their meaning from their usage. In the previous thread JNS wanted to mediate our disagreement about what the word “responsibility” means by appealing to the OED. In general, I think that is a fine approach, but as I mentioned, this sort of thing only gets you so far. When we went to the OED we found that someone was responsible if they were “answerable” and “accountable.” Of course, these words need as much explanation as “responsibility” does in a philosphical discussion such as the one we are trying to have.
If you really want to know what the word means, you need something like the studies Blake is referring to, so that you can find out what people really mean when they assign responsibility to someone. What we find is that compatibilism does not adequately capture the meaning of the word responsibility as it is actually used.
This doesn’t mean that people are correct about the universe (I am not suggesting we settle the debate by a vote of what most people have assumed). However, it does mean that compatibilists are redefining the word to suit their worldview. At the very least, they need to acknowledge that what they mean by “responsibility” is not what the average person has assumed when they used the word.
Comment by Jacob J — July 10, 2007 @ 4:56 pm
Geoff, you said, “in the absence of LFW every present choice is caused by some prior state of affairs.” That appears a claim of causal determinism, unless you mean caused in a looser sense such as indeterminists accept. But in that case LFW entails such causality as well.
As for an alternative, consider randomness. It isn’t, for obvious reasons, LFW, but it clearly isn’t causal determinism.
Comment by clark — July 10, 2007 @ 9:16 pm
Alright Clark. I will grant you that randomness is another alternative to LFW. Of course attributing our present choices to randomness is also totally incompatible with the gospel and with the concept of moral responsibility.
You chimed in earlier by saying:
But you have suggested no alternatives to LFW that are compatible with the gospel. Further, you have not remotely backed up your charge that about the “false dichotomies” here. The dichotomy I offer is a real one: Either some variation on LFW is true or the restored gospel and many of its crucial parts fail. If you really think that is a false dichotomy please show me the error of my ways.
Comment by Geoff J — July 10, 2007 @ 10:58 pm
Let us undertake the following thought experiment:
We create a multitude of identical people and place them in a situation where all circumstances - external as well as the ones that are internal knowledge, desires etc.
There are two possibilities either the person makes the same choices in all these universes or he does not.
If he does not, why? What causes the same person with the same desires and same knowledge to choose differently? He wanted the same things, he had belief in the same things - and thus the same expectation of action -> consequences
The answer that comes to mind is that there is something that is forcing him to choose and that randomly.
You talk of predestination and that if a persons choices can be predicted they are predestined. I think this is false. You are assuming that their “destiny” is external, forced upon them. I see it as something that they created bubbling up out of them as it were.
Your argument is that if my choices can be predicted then there is no free will. I after thinking about it have come to the opposite conclusion. If my choices cannot be predicted, even by myself, then there is no free will and certianly no reason for me to put any weight on any of my decisions as tomorrow I may unpredictably and uninfluences by what I thought today reject all of todays choices. Thus any particular choice does not matter. Hence even though I attain salvation/exaltation I may unpredictably choose to reject that salvation/exaltation. Given that is a real possibility why should I strive for salvation. There would be no point to it as I may easily choose to fall after having obtained. As we are eternal beings any possibility that we fall, taken over eternity turns into certianty. That is why black holes evaporate.
Which brings me to my next topic. Electrons are inherently unpredictable as far as we know. Yet those who think that there is know greater truth than newtonian, einsteinian and quantum do not think that the unpredicatability of an electron’s behavior hints that it has free will.
If I can predict someones action that does not mean that person does not have free will any more than if their actions are completely unpredictable. Your argument that if it is predictable then they were forced to it either by external circumstances or internal such as desires or character points to an obvious parallel argument against unpredictable free will. Namely we analyze their motives their actions etc., all the things you identify as “influences” when we finally after breaking down the whole process identify the unpredictable element we say that that made them do it. We can call this element destiny if we like (it certianly fits the bill!) and then say that in our thought universe that destiny made people in some universes choose X but in others choose Y and in still others choose Z.
Thus your arguments that predicatable free will destroys the gospel are equally suited to the task of proving that unpredictable free will destroys the gospel. The conclusion then is that the gospel is not valid or your arguments are not valid. The predicatable or unpredicatable nature of free will is not relevant.
Comment by madera verde — July 11, 2007 @ 7:09 am
I should say - that is the logic behind the theory, generally excepted, that black holes evaporate.
It should be -no greater truth, not know greater truth.
Excuse my grammar and errors I am in haste. For that reason I probably won’t get involved in the debate.
Comment by madera verde — July 11, 2007 @ 7:13 am
madera verde,
I am fully aware of the arguments in favor of causal determinism that you presented. We have discussed those at great length here in the past. The problem is that there can be no meaningful moral responsibility in a fully causally determined universe. The same is true in any universe where the future is fixed. So while others might find those arguments conclusive, as a Mormon with a God-provided testimony of the restored gospel I reject them based on the additional evidence that testimony provides me. In other words, a fixed future of any kind eviscerates the restored gospel so as far as I am concerned it must be rejected in favor of the open future that only LFW provides.
Your argument is that if my choices can be predicted then there is no free will.
This is inaccurate. I am not arguing against predictions at all. In fact I have argued in the past that God is the ultimate predictor. But predictions can happen in a universe with an open future too. It is the notion of a fixed future (as full determinism requires) that I am arguing against.
Comment by Geoff J — July 11, 2007 @ 9:52 am
Madera Verde,
I don’t think it is well established that electrons are inherently unpredictable. It is a measurement problem. Schroedinger’s equation is deterministic and there are alternate formulations (notably Bohmian QM) with equivalent statistics that do not require an arbitrary waveform reduction step.
I think your thought experiment is worth discussion. Your questions imply that each person’s decisions can only be derived from prior causes. In LFW that is not the case - decisions are a creative synthesis of prior causes. The extra ‘element’ is most definitely not destiny it is the agent itself.
Your thought experiment requires that persons be duplicated. However, if each person has a distinct eternal intelligence that is a metaphysical impossibility.
Supposing, however, that it were metaphysically possible to do such duplication, it is highly likely that in the short run the causative physiological factors (habits, memories, etc.) would dominate the post-duplicative agent causal creative influence.
But supposing that you placed a large ensemble of duplicates in identical universes where each is immediately faced with a borderline moral or creative challenge, LFW would indeed predict that their behavior would diverge.
That is hardly a logical crisis. It would simply mean that the agents are now independent, each able to creatively synthesize in new and independent ways - making decisions that are not completely determined by prior factors. We should be very disturbed if this were not the case, because it would imply that we were nothing more than automatons, and replicable ones at that.
Comment by Mark D. — July 11, 2007 @ 6:21 pm
Geoff, your and Blake’s arguments end up reducing to the words having the meaning they appear to mean. And I’ll grant you that has prima facie strength. Why not assume the scriptures mean what they literally say and our intuitions regarding the communications. At best I can say that God speaks to us in our language and that language is “good enough.” If, however, it turned out that our meaning of responsibility, freedom, etc. needed some revision I don’t see that really be problematic for the scriptures nor would I be at all surprised to find that it was the case.
Comment by clark — July 11, 2007 @ 8:56 pm
Mark, the restrictions on the electron are deterministic, the idea that this is purely a measurement issue (i.e. that there is “hidden” variables) is less likely given recent experiments. It’s still not ruled out, but I think randomness has the strength now.
Comment by clark — July 11, 2007 @ 9:02 pm
Clark,
You seem to be committed to the idea that there are acceptable alternatives to LFW, but I haven’t seen you articulate one yet. Saying that you don’t think it would really be problematic to redefine responsibility doesn’t give me a lot of comfort unless you can offer me some non-problematic redefinition. All of the ones I can think of are very problematic. I appreciate your assurance that there are perfectly acceptable alternatives to choice and accountability (as we have naively conceived of them), but can you back up these assurances with something concrete?
Comment by Jacob J — July 11, 2007 @ 9:20 pm
Clark,
I am familiar with the recent experiment on the subject, but I think it is too early to make any hard conclusions. The recent experiment did not invalidate all “hidden variable” theories, only a certain class of them.
However, I must say that I find the prospect of intrinsic randomness rather more disturbing than ordinary determinism. It brings the very concept of scientific realism into question, and solutions like the many worlds interpretation are first class lunacy.
I majored in physics, and never did I lose so much confidence in physicists as during senior year quantum mechanics. No self respecting physicist could claim that a wave function collapse is real. I find it amazing to consider the number who believe that reality is governed by non-reality.
Standard Quantum mechanics states that if one sets up a system and then goes away for a few billion years, that results when he returns will be a statistical sample of a wave function that has been evolving deterministically like clockwork in the meantime. Are we supposed to believe that the universe is only random when God is looking? LFW is a model of comprehension by comparison.
Comment by Mark D. — July 11, 2007 @ 10:12 pm
To say that there may be alternatives is not to state that one necessarily knows them. My view is simply that to argue that nothing but LFW works seems to require more argument than has been presented. That it might be the only one that works that you know isn’t sufficient (IMO). I recognize that not everyone will find that terribly persuasive. However, to give an example, neither QM nor GR seem like a satisfactory solution for a theory of everything, but the fact that I can’t give a better solution doesn’t entail the right solution being one of the existing proposed solutions. It may well simply be we don’t know the answer.
That’s all I’m saying.
My doubts towards LFW I’ll fully admit come out of physics. I just haven’t seen (to me) satisfactory answers to to problem of background independence and substantial space-time.
Comment by clark — July 11, 2007 @ 10:47 pm
Mark, I think I said it didn’t invalidate all hidden variable theories. (Indeed I think I clearly indicated the opposite) It sure invalidated most of them though.
I don’t see how randomness as an ontological feature of the universe has any bearing on scientific realism. They seem quite orthagonal issues as I see them. (Not to derail things into a tangent)
Comment by clark — July 11, 2007 @ 10:49 pm
Clark,
If there were a strictly realistic theory for quantum randomness I could agree, but for now the randomness comes only from the subjective interaction of a mysterious ‘observer’ and the system. Nothing realistic about it.
More on point though, adding quantum randomness certainly doesn’t remediate the purposelessness and meaninglessness of ordinary determinism - if anything it makes it worse.
The basic question is finding an explanation or meaning for anything beyond random chance. With LFW we can trace the ultimate cause of significant events to responsible agents. With the alternatives the ultimate cause lies in nothing but one of the three possibilities:
(1) Natural laws
(2) Random initial conditions
(3) Process derived randomness
So if I ask the question, “why do we have a Sabbath day and keep it holy?”, a non-LFWist can only ultimately answer one of two things - it is a law of nature, or it is a physical coincidence. Same for every other question I could possibly ask.
Why is there a God? It is a law of nature or a physical coincidence.
Why do we have ten fingers? It is a law of nature or a physical coincidence.
Why was Jesus Christ resurrected? It is a law of nature or a physical coincidence.
And so on, ad nauseam…
Comment by Mark D. — July 11, 2007 @ 11:26 pm
Clark,
What I hear you saying is basically: “Just because a plain reading of the scriptures indicates there is libertarian free will; and just because no one in the history of the earth has ever come up with an alternative to LFW that allows for the gospel to work or for people to have any moral responsibility; there still may be an alternative to LFW that could possibly arise someday.” It reminds me of the old line: “Yeah and monkeys may fly out of my…” well, never mind about the old saying.
LFW can have a lot of variation and I believe that whatever the final truth of the matter is, it will and must be properly be classified as some variation of LFW.
Comment by Geoff J — July 12, 2007 @ 12:36 am
Clark,
My view is simply that to argue that nothing but LFW works seems to require more argument than has been presented.
Okay, I accept this statement. Let me ask some follow up questions, though.
1. Do you agree that determinism is incompatible with the type of responsibility required by the gospel? (#15 seems to say so)
2. Do you agree that the addition of randomness is not sufficient to salvage responsibility from causal determinism?
3. Do you agree that under-determinism, per se, does not imply a robust form of responsibility?
4. Do you agree that any solution which genuinely supports responsibility will require that people have some degree of control over what they do?
Comment by Jacob J — July 12, 2007 @ 8:28 am
Geoff, I take it as a principle that the scriptures aren’t there to teach metaphysics, physics or other very obscure issues. So when one draws such inferences out from the scriptures I always find it interesting but always approach it with a very skeptical eye. (It’s obvious I enjoy it since I do it myself) Put an other way, I think the scriptures are too “fuzzy” to trust inferences along these lines.
Put it an other way, the folks who read Genesis as rejecting most science and history would say nearly the same thing you do.
So I just tend to be skeptical of such matters unless a very clear revelation is made on the matter.
Comment by Clark — July 12, 2007 @ 8:47 am
Jacob - note the example of randomness was just to illustrate the unfortunate false dichotomy raised of determinism vs. LFW. I don’t in the least think randomness resolves the issues LFW proponents raise. Indeed there’s considerable literature on the issue of “luck” and freedom. (And yes, I’ve read it - while I’m skeptical on these matters I’m hardly unread on them)
Regarding underdeterminism and responsibility. Clearly undeterdetermination alone is insufficient for responsibility. That goes without saying. I merely point out that by framing the issue purely in terms of determinism one often ends up attacking strawmen. Very few people are determinists anymore.
Comment by Clark — July 12, 2007 @ 8:50 am
Put it an other way, the folks who read Genesis as rejecting most science and history would say nearly the same thing you do.
You are certainly free to be skeptical of whatever you want Clark.
I think that this analogy you gave is a good one though. Some people think that God was involved in directing the formation of the earth in one way or another. If God was involved in one way or another then some variety of creationism is true. If God was not involved at all then no form of creationism is true. So that too is a binary issue at that high level — there is no middle ground on that question at that level.
Likewise, it is a binary question about LFW. Either people can freely choose some things as defined by LFW and thus have moral responsibility or they can’t. As I see it, there is no middle ground on that question either. I know you have disagreed but I am not sure why. Maybe you think that something besides a variation LFW will allow for our moral responsibility some day. I suspect that whatever that “something” might be, I’d probably consider it to be under the LFW tent to begin with.
Comment by Geoff J — July 12, 2007 @ 9:18 am
But of course there is a middle ground - to what degree God was involved. It’s that issue of degree that I see as important.
Certainly one can cast any debate in an absolute binary way. (Either this theory is true or it isn’t) I’m not sure that’s a good way to go about understanding myself.
Comment by Clark — July 12, 2007 @ 10:05 am
Clark: I’m not sure that’s a good way to go about understanding myself.
Well excluding some theories up front sure narrows down the scope of possibilities. That is the value of excluding full determinism/randomness up front. With those off the table we can then narrow things down to some theory that fits broadly under the LFW tent. Stubbornly refusing to do even that just ends up leading to less mutual understanding in these conversations than more in my opinion.
I’ve seen you do that with intelligent design over and over at blogs too and it baffles me. You go around claiming to reject intelligent design even though the term intelligent design is a very big tent that surely allows for your position after all. But if I remember correctly, when pressed you are really only rejecting the narrowly defined idea that you think of as “intelligent design proper”. That, of course, leads to more confusion than understanding in those conversations as well. Some form of what could be broadly called intelligent design must be right or a) God was not involved in creation at all, or b) the vast majority of our science is dead wrong. Neither of those alternatives are remotely appealing to me.
The same goes for these LFW conversations. You openly reject full determinism and you reject randomness as explanations for our choices. That leaves you with some form of LFW. But every time this conversation comes up you chime in about how “skeptical” you are about LFW. I think that is simply misleading and I don’t know what you are hoping to gain from this odd tactic you keep using. Repeatedly using that line leads to less mutual understanding and not more in my opinion. Why not just say that some version of LFW must be true but you are not sure how that works at all and are skeptical of the more aggressive theories of LFW out there or something?
Comment by Geoff J — July 12, 2007 @ 10:26 am
Well I don’t want to get into the intelligent design debate. I think the broadness of the use of that term is precisely what makes it so problematic. (i.e. it ends up being misleading and, I’m convinced, often intentionally so)
Once again to say that if I reject determinism and randomness that this leaves only LFW just seems false. Just because I don’t know of other choices need not mean there are no other choices. That’s the only point I’m making. (Although as you’d earlier noted I’d thrown out other alternatives on my own blog in the past)
It’s this focus on saying that if something isn’t one choice it must be the other that seems logically suspect. (Actually it’s a logical fallacy)
Comment by clark — July 12, 2007 @ 11:54 am
Alright Clark. It appears that I am just defining LFW more broadly than you are. As far as I am concerned, if the future is not fixed then some variation of LFW exists and if the future is fixed then there is no LFW. So at least I have some vague idea of what you mean when you say you are skeptical of LFW.
Comment by Geoff J — July 12, 2007 @ 1:04 pm
Note I was talking about ID being too broad, not LFW.
Comment by clark — July 12, 2007 @ 6:31 pm
Although if you call anything where the future isn’t fixed (whatever that means) LFW then, yeah, that’s pretty broadly defined. Much more broadly that I encounter in the literature.
Afterall, what if blocks of time arise. To adopt a hypothetical situation, let’s say the next week is fixed but nothing beyond that. Is there still LFW?
Comment by clark — July 12, 2007 @ 7:31 pm
Clark,
Not during that interval. And no one would argue that indeterminism is a sufficient condition for LFW. Necessary, yes - sufficient no.
The concept of a fixed future has a perfectly adequate definition. It means the future states are a fixed function of prior states - the defining characteristic of determinism - the future is determined or fixed by the past. Probably the most well defined philosophical concept ever devised.
Comment by Mark D. — July 12, 2007 @ 8:21 pm
Yep, I have the same answer. There would be no LFW during that hypothetical interval.
Comment by Geoff J — July 12, 2007 @ 8:23 pm
Isn’t it enough to assert that of the options we are aware of, LFW seems to be the best and only candidate for what can deliver the requirements of a moral life and a life in which rationality is possible?
Comment by Blake — July 12, 2007 @ 10:57 pm
I thought some of you might like a slightly different take on the issues. I favor determinism from the perspective that the prophets have consistently taught that God knows future states for actions which He holds such people accountable for. I do so because I know that starting from a purely philosophical background, I simply won’t have all of the correct premises and facts to come to the correct conclusion (as opposed to the “best and only candidate” of Blake’s previous post).
However, since we are discussing the philosophical implications of our beliefs, I’ll try to answer the questions in post #37 (just to get things rolling–I recognize they weren’t directed at me).
1. Do you agree that determinism is incompatible with the type of responsibility required by the gospel?
No. The incompatibility is usually expressed in some form of “doing other than you did/will do” but I don’t think responsibility comes from some power to do otherwise.
2. Do you agree that the addition of randomness is not sufficient to salvage responsibility from causal determinism?
I am actually unsure whether philosophical “randomness” is well-defined or simply incoherent.
4. Do you agree that any solution which genuinely supports responsibility will require that people have some degree of control over what they do?
Yes. But isn’t that definitional? For something to exist, doesn’t it have to have some degree of control over what *it* does?
Best,
P. Nielsen
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 15, 2007 @ 1:56 pm
P. Nielsen,
In the literature, there are two types of control described, “regulative control” and “guidance control”. Guidance control is the weak sense - control evidenced by an effective causal connection between intent and action. Regulative control is the strong sense - control evidenced by the ability to take different actions given the same set of prior conditions.
A compatibilist would say that “guidance control” (such as that apparently exhibited by an aircraft auto-pilot) is all that is necessary to attach moral responsibility. A libertarian incompatibilist would say rather that “regulative control” is required - that guidance control alone is too weak to establish that the responsible party could have done otherwise given the same circumstances, and that such an ability is necessary to make an ascription of moral responsibility to an untoward action meaningful.
You have stated that you disagree with this assertion. So what do you think are the conditions required for moral responsibility instead?
For example, suppose a drunk driver seriously injures an innocent party one day. How are we to hold him responsible if it has never been possible for him to avoid drinking, not from the day of his birth, nor before?
Comment by Mark D. — July 15, 2007 @ 5:09 pm
P. Neilsen: For something to exist, doesn’t it have to have some degree of control over what *it* does?
I don’t think so. Rocks exist. Do you assert that a rock has “some degree of control” over what it does? (See the discussion of the moral responsibility and rocks in the last thread.)
Comment by Geoff J — July 15, 2007 @ 6:23 pm
Geoff J,
If you were to say, “The rock did action A” then yes, I would say the rock has “some degree of control” over action A (otherwise the rock didn’t *do* action A). But it appears I misunderstood “control” as used by Mark so I will address that now.
—-
Mark D,
While I would classify myself as a compatibilist in some regards, I don’t accept the idea that “guidance control” is *all* that is necessary to attach moral responsibility. Even little children and animals have guidance control, but we don’t hold them accountable. I believe that one must also (at least) have a certain degree of intelligence, and know God’s laws (i.e. have the light of Christ, or a conscience).
Also, I have never understood it when someone has said something to the effect that a “responsible party could have done otherwise given the same circumstances”. Are you saying that if I am pondering whether or not to steal a donut and I choose not to, and you had some way of reversing time, and erasing the future I just created, then it is not only possible but likely that I would choose to steal the donut after all (if you repeated the process enough times)? (If not, tell me what you mean.) Not only does that seem like a strange thing to posit, but it would bother me *more* than all of the issues with determinism. And it would seem to lead into randomness, wouldn’t it? Anyway, I’d appreciate you laying down exactly what you mean, so I can grasp what sort of LFW you subscribe to.
Anyway, in my understanding there is a lot that is required for moral responsibility. And in fact, I lean towards the idea that it is simply a mystery. But, for the sake of moving the discussion forward, I will attempt to answer your implicit question: The conditions needed are 1) a God, 2) a knowledge of His rules, and 3) an understanding of the difference between good and evil. I personally believe that “guidance control” is just an aspect of existence, so it goes without saying.
Maybe you could present a scenario where you believe guidance control (and the above) are insufficient for moral responsibility.
Best,
P. Nielsen
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 15, 2007 @ 7:50 pm
Geoff J,
In thinking about it a little more, I realize I may have been a little flippant in stating what I did state. I might rephrase it by saying that “control” is relative to your point of view.
Do you control your hand movements? You would answer “Yes” (unless you aren’t able–in which case I apologize!), but in reality you control only the neurons which send signals to your hand, do you not? And yet, your hand is part of *you*, so you do control it. Besides, do you really control those neurons, or does the process recede back further? Where do *you* reside? It is this issue of “what am I composed of” that is at the heart of the issue in my opinion (and also goes to answer those scenarios you might have seen about evil scientists implanting brain control chips).
The answer, I think, is that our identities are more fluid than we are prone to believe at first. We humans have fairly distinct borders between each other (from our point of view–without implanted brain-control devices) but look at the life-cycles of some marine animals. It is pretty neat how they can merge together, break apart, and merge again.
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 15, 2007 @ 8:09 pm
P. Nielsen,
Libertarian free will (LFW) is indeterminist by definition. It requires a sui generis kind of causation generally called agent causation where a sentient being creatively influences the future in a manner not fully determined by prior conditions, nor which is random.
That means that yes, given a sufficiently borderline case, a different decision could issue in the time reversal scenario, one that would be traceable to the free will of the agent itself in each instance. Otherwise free will wouldn’t be free.
On some views this agent causation is a property of a spirit or an eternal intelligence, on other view it is an emergent property of a living organisms. It is not something that physics can currently explain, but there are reasonably persuasive arguments that moral responsibility is meaningless without something of the kind.
I repeat the scenario I raised before. A drunk driver critically injures an innocent person. How are we to hold him responsible if there never was any possibility that his drinking could have been avoided, not on the day of his birth, nor before?
That is what determinism entails, and that is a prima facie argument that moral responsibility in a deterministic world is nonsense and furthermore that divine judgment for actions a person never had regulative control over (i.e. could have avoided) is absurd.
Comment by Mark D. — July 15, 2007 @ 8:49 pm
P Nielsen,
You may be interested to check out the Free will vs. determinism category of posts here at the Thang. (See this category for the related discussion of foreknowledge as well.) As you might surmise, all of the standard arguments against LFW and for determinism/compatibilism have been hashed over at some length. Mark did a nice job in #55 of summarizing some of the reasons why after all that debate I am more firmly convinced that the restored gospel fails in the absence of some form of LFW than I was going into these debates.
Comment by Geoff J — July 15, 2007 @ 9:17 pm
Dear Geoff J,
I recognize that I’m jumping in at the middle, so to speak. Thanks for the links. I had already looked at the “Does God know the biggest number” thread. Being a mathematician by trade, I could have shed some light on the arguments, but it appears it was settled well.
I’m here both to give another perspective that might differ from what you’ve seen before, and learn in the process.
—————–
Mark D.,
I understand that LFW is indeterministic by definition. But, there are all kinds of determinism, as I understand it. For the moment, I’ll assume you are using something like “all future moments are a function of previous moments”. I personally accept a slightly weaker form–i.e. future moments can be determined by God (but this doesn’t, for example, necessarily imply that time and causality are linear).
I also understand the claim that libertarian free will involves its own kind of causation, which is further claimed to neither be determined by prior conditions, nor be random. I have yet to see any good argument that such a thing could even exist. What do you see as the difference between such a “creative influence” on the future as opposed to a “random influence”? In other words, is there any thought experiment we could run to differentiate between the two?
Along these lines, I am further interested in your answer to the following question: Is there a way to define LFW without resorting to scenarios which are entirely (logically!) impossible (such as “if we could reverse time and erase the future, but not change any starting states [and yet remember what you chose in that future], you *could* do differently”)? My lack of training on these subjects may be showing now, but I have never seen a definition of LFW which doesn’t resort to such.
I’m also interested in what you mean by “borderline case”? Are not all freely chosen acts, according to LFW, such? If not, how can we hold anyone morally responsible (under your view) when we don’t know which cases are borderline or not?
You are asking, implicitly, how justice and morality relate to “possible worlds.” Determinism (at least the form I subscribe to) does not rule out a “possible world” where the guy decided not to drink after all. That seems to be a mischaracterization of compatibilism.
Best,
P. Nielsen
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 16, 2007 @ 9:51 am
P. Nielsen,
You are asking, implicitly, how justice and morality relate to “possible worlds.”
I don’t think it is really a question about possible worlds. The question is: How can you hold someone morally responsible for an action which it was never in their power to avoid? Of course, this causes us to examine the meaning of “in their power.” In a deterministic paradigm, “in their power” turns out to mean “is what they did because of how their atoms are arranged.” Thus, the best you can do is to hold them responsible for being what they happen to be, which again, was never in their power to control (they turned out this way because of how their atoms used to be arranged).
It is like holding a rock morally responsible because it does not float. The fact that you behave in a certain way does not mean you are responsible. Responsibility requires that it was in your power to do something else and you chose not to do so. This is why other possible worlds allowed by determinism do not help. Saying that I would have done something different if the big bang had been slightly different does not make me morally responsible for an action which was destined to happen from 15 billion years before I was born.
Do we hold the drunk driver accountable because there is a possible world in which he is not a drunk, or because he could have (and should have) brought a designated driver in this world?
Comment by Jacob J — July 16, 2007 @ 10:37 am
P. Nielsen: I have yet to see any good argument that such a thing could even exist.
Blake has a pretty good theory of how agent causation might work. See here for a short version of his theory.
As for arguments that LFW in general could exist– The point of these last few posts is to emphasize the argument that the restored gospel implodes if there is no such thing as LFW in one form or another. From a Mormon perspective, arguing for a fully deterministic (or random) universe is a non-starter since there can be no moral responsibility as required by the Plan of Salvation in such realities.
Comment by Geoff J — July 16, 2007 @ 11:12 am
Geoff J,
I’ll take a look. Thanks.
——-
Jacob J,
I think before one explores what “in their power” means, one should explain what “hold someone morally accountable” means? For example, if I answered your question by saying “I hold them morally accountable because they knew the law, and were not coerced into their actions by outside forces, and recognized good and evil” what is your response? I think this will help me understand where you are coming from.
The “possible worlds” come in when defining power. Do you not define power in terms of “possibilities” (i.e. possible worlds)?
Is there a possible world where the rock does float?
I would say that responsibility requires that is was *possible* for you to do something else, and you chose not to do so.
True. That’s why I don’t buy into that sort of determinism.
What does it mean when you say “he could have…in this world”? It means, if I am not mistaken, exactly that there was a possible world where it did happen.
Best,
P. Nielsen
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 16, 2007 @ 1:18 pm
if I answered your question by saying “I hold them morally accountable because they knew the law, and were not coerced into their actions by outside forces, and recognized good and evil” what is your response?
To respond, I would need to know many more details about your view. Your careful use of the phrase “outside forces” leads me to guess that you are doing the standard compatibilist thing of saying we can hold people morally accountable for behaving they way they do so long as their internal makeup was part of determining what they did. If that is what you are saying, I would respond as I did in #58.
The “possible worlds” come in when defining power. Do you not define power in terms of “possibilities” (i.e. possible worlds)?
From several of your comments, it seems clear that we have been talking past one another on the topic of “possible worlds.” I do define power in terms of possibilities. I think we need to be more precise about where possibilities arise. In the usual deterministic universe, everything that happens is a consequence of the prior state of of the universe. (In #57 you said you accept a weaker form of determinism, but I couldn’t tell what you meant by your description of the kind of determinism you accept.) If the usual deterministic universe is the real one, then possibilities do not exist at the time an agent makes a choice. The last time there were real possibilities (not merely logical ones) was at the big bang (since we don’t know how to trace physical causality into the darkness of Planck time, but everything after that has been causally determined by prior states). That is why I mentioned the big bang. In your view, where do actual possibilities exist?
Is there a possible world where the rock does float?
Of course. The universe could have unfolded such that this rock would have formed to be pumice instead of granite.
I would say that responsibility requires that is was *possible* for you to do something else, and you chose not to do so.
Again, where do you situate the possibility? Are you talking logical possibility, possibility on the time-scale of the universe, or possibility at the time that the choice was made.
Comment by Jacob J — July 16, 2007 @ 2:05 pm
P. Neilsen,
The problem with responsibility can be seen as boiling down to whether there is a fixed future or an open future. In a universe where the future is fixed, there can never be the power for anyone to opt-out of their predestined fate. If no one can opt out of their fate then how could they be held “responsible” for any of their actions when they are literally not able to respond any differently than their predestined fate dictates? Yet that is what full determinism gives us.
Also, you said something about “I don’t buy into that sort of determinism”. I don’t know what you mean buy this. What kind of determinism do you have in mind exactly?
Comment by Geoff J — July 16, 2007 @ 2:13 pm
P. Nielsen,
All statements implicitly refer to this world unless otherwise specified. Of course things might be different in some alternate reality, but in this world (if determinism is correct) the drunk driver never had regulative control over whether he drank or not.
In an alternate reality, anything goes - the driver might not even exist. How anything in an alternate reality relevant to his moral responsibility in this world? It is the ultimate cop-out.
By borderline condition, I refer to the fact that any sensible theory of LFW has joint causation. The driver has a genetic inheritance, and his nature and instincts are the result of lifelong conditioning. Self-conditioning in particular which in LFW he is personally responsible for due to his history of free choices.
So in a time reversal scenario, the probability with which an agent repeats the same action surely depends on the balance between his physiological instincts and agent causal regulative control in that situation. A borderline situation would be the sort of decision where red flags are raised internally causing the agent to consider carefully the action he is about to take, which would certainly increase the dominance of immediate agent causal influence over developed instinct.
Finally the difference between agent causation and randomness is that the agent purposely chooses which action to take in the former case. There is no purpose inherent in random influences, by definition.
Comment by Mark D. — July 16, 2007 @ 2:45 pm
Dear Mark, Geoff, and Jacob,
I am enjoying your comments. However, there are three different fronts I seemingly have to address. I think I’m going to have to limit my responses quite a bit, and focus on just one little thing at a time, just to keep up.
I can answer one thing now (and I’ll try to get to something else later tonight). The sort of determinism I believe in is that the future exists in such a way that God can view all time. I don’t necessarily believe that the future is simply a function of past states however.
Best,
P. Nielsen
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 16, 2007 @ 6:16 pm
P. Nielsen,
The type of “simple foreknowledge” that you describe does not necessarily require determinism, but it has several of the same weaknesses.
Notably, it appears to be a useless ability. What good would it do for God to see the future if he couldn’t change it?
More on this topic here.
Comment by Mark D. — July 16, 2007 @ 7:29 pm
Dear Mark D,
I agree that it doesn’t necessarily require determinism (in a strong sense). But I do not believe it to be a useless ability. In fact, I believe it was Brigham Young who said that we couldn’t be just judges until we, like God, knew the future.
Besides, even the Book of Mormon points out another use of knowing the future; you can make back-up plans (a.k.a. the plates of Nephi).
Cheers,
P. Nielsen
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 16, 2007 @ 8:22 pm
P. Nielsen,
The idea of making a backup plan for a known future is logically incoherent. Indeed, if one can see the future, making any kind of plan is incoherent.
Or do you mean to say that God sees a probable future rather than the actual future, and he is making contingency preparations for events that may or may not come to pass.
Comment by Mark D. — July 16, 2007 @ 8:37 pm
Dear Mark,
You are creating a straw-man. I never said God makes “back-up plans.” Further, I do not believe the statement “if one can see the future, making any kind of plan is incoherent”. It depends on the manner of seeing the future. For all I know, when God sees the future it is a mystical creative synthesis, just as LFW posits. [In fact, I'm even tempted to argue that if indeed LFW is coherent, so would a simple foreknowledge of God in which the future is creatively synthesized. More on this below.]
I do not see it as likely that God’s dealing with the Nephites, regarding the plates of Nephi, was a contingency plan in the (improbable) case that Martin Harris chose to do good, and happened to join Joseph, and Joseph happened to ask three times, and God gave the go-ahead, and then Martin happened to fail to live up to his promise. And what about the prophecies that it would be Joseph who translated the plates? etc..
But I’d like to get back to the comment:
I’m not sure I follow. What definition of “random” are you using? I thought it would be logicaly possible (if randomness is coherent) for someone to randomly but purposefully choose to do either A or not A. In fact, don’t a few studies say that many people give purpose to their actions after the actions have been decided (and even acted) upon?
Also, one more question for all three of you. But first a little background. In geometry, Euclid came up with five postulates (or axioms) thousands of years ago. And the rest of geometry was derived from these basis rules. For a long time, it was an open question whether the fifth axiom followed from the other four. Finally, it was shown that it didn’t. The fifth axiom was: “given an line L and any point P, there is a unique line through P parallel to L.” The proof that there was no proof of postulate 5 from the others was that one can model *in Euclidean geometry* spaces which do not satisfy axiom 5, but do satisfy axiom 4 (and vice versa). From these ideals, what is now called “model theory” was born. It was discovered that many familiar systems can be modelled in different (and seemingly contradictory ways).
So, here is my question. From everything I’ve seen, nobody has been able to come up with any way of testing whether or not our universe is deterministic or not. But I am further wondering whether there are actually two compatible models of the universe, one of which is deterministic, and the other has LFW and indeterminism. In other words, can one prove that if the universe can be described via LFW and indeterminism, can it equally be described via determinism (and vice versa)?
Cheers,
P. Nielsen
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 17, 2007 @ 7:41 am
Dear Mark,
To my chagrin, I looked back at my post, and I did indeed say “back-up plans.” I apologize!!! That isn’t quite the concept I was trying to portray. Sorry for the confusion!
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 17, 2007 @ 7:42 am
P Nielsen,
But I am further wondering whether there are actually two compatible models of the universe, one of which is deterministic, and the other has LFW and indeterminism.
If we were really going to pursue this question seriously, it would lead to a discussion of subjectivism (or perspectivism if you prefer). If you believe there is a objective reality (despite whatever limitations we have in ascertaining the nature of that reality) then “determinism” and “indeterminism” are not just ways of interpreting our experience, but statements about the way things really are. If this is the case, then it is logically impossible to be both deterministic and indeterministic simultaneously (via the law of noncontradiction).
Describing the same system in various geometries is not like describing them in terms of determinism and indeterminism because in the former case, there is a mapping from one description to the other. In the latter case, the two descriptions would flatly contradict one another about the facts of the system. So I don’t see how the two descriptions could be compatible.
Comment by Jacob J — July 17, 2007 @ 9:28 am
Dear Jacob J,
You are right to a point. I agree that it is impossible to be both deterministic and indeterministic simultaneously (unless logic is wrong, and in that case, what can we say?). However, I am not entirely sure you grasp the contradictions that do arise when mapping from Euclidean geometry to non-Euclidean geometry. The descriptions can contradict one another *from inside the system* but not from without.
Let me give a concrete example to wrap your brain around. Suppose we are in the usual 3-dimensional Euclidean geometry. Lines are lines, points are points, and we can use our everyday intuition here. Now, picture a sphere. If we wrap a line around a sphere, we get a circle on the sphere. Sometimes these circles don’t intersect one another, but if they do intersect then they can do so in one or two places (as opposed to lines which only intersect in at most one place). We call these circles A-lines (A is for Alternate). One can define geometry using A-lines rather than real lines. However, to someone in Euclidean geometry, it would be contradictory to speak of lines when one means A-lines. And yet, the point is that there is a geometry with *lines* (if you will) intersecting in two places.
But, anyway, that is slightly getting off the point. The real point is what happened later, when mathematicians found out that they can come up with *different* models of the *same* structure. So, if you like thinking of the “natural numbers” as existing in objective reality; model theory is not for you. My question is this: Is there a *nice* deterministic model for an indeterministic world (and vice versa)? [I will try to define *nice* below.]
One reason I bring this up is because oftentimes I’ve heard it said that the problem with determinism is that we don’t have “real” choice (whatever that is). I think this is speaking to the issue of models, at some level. These people simply do not like the deterministic model of the universe; but are not dissatisfied by how the universe really is (per se).
Further, I *do* think you are right that the mapping plays into part of the problem. As I understand it, compatibilists do not take “agency” to mean “the image of agency from an indeterministic world, mapped to a deterministic one.” [I suppose this would look like a computer given a program to think it has free-choice.] On the other hand, I am wondering if there is a *nice* mapping (not the straightforward one) which does allow compatibilism to correspond to LFW.
Cheers,
P. Nielsen
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 17, 2007 @ 10:59 am
Dear Mark,
You said:
As I understand it, the idea of “possible worlds” is a technical way of talking about possibilities for the universe which are not logically necessary. If it were *logically* necessary for him to drive drunk, then (I think you’d agree) we couldn’t hold such a person accountable. So, having the possibility of doing something else if extremely important.
Did that answer you question about how I see moral responsibility is (at its basic level) intertwined with possible worlds?
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 17, 2007 @ 11:08 am
P Nielsen (#71),
I don’t think your concrete example about geometries requires any amendments to my previous comments. I suppose if you come up with a “nice” mapping like the one you are after it would get a lot of attention. At the moment, I am convinced such a mapping does not exist, but I would be willing to consider one if it was proposed. Simply musing that perhaps there is a solution no one has thought of doesn’t seem to get us very far. Earlier in this thread, Clark was championing the idea that there might be something which is not LFW, not determinism, not randomness, which would explain choice adequately and support responsibility. I view your suggestion (that there is nice mapping which would allow compatibilism to correspond to LFW) in much the same way as his. Geoff said it more colorfully in #36.
In general, I am suspicious of analogies because they tend to obscure and obfuscate more often than the illuminate and elucidate. Your comparison to geometry only further cements this for me. I don’t see any likelihood that we will finally reconcile determinism with indeterminism by leveraging analogies to Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry. Almost always, the desire to think about things by way of analogy indicates that we don’t understand the thing well enough to think about it directly. And if that’s the case, how will we be able to know where the analogy works and where it breaks down?
Finally, I don’t think my objection to determinism is a issue of models as you suggest. Several times already in the comments here, various people have explained in very direct and coherent ways why determinism, per se, is incompatible with moral responsibility. They haven’t just appealed to a term like “real choice” without defining that term. I am committed to the existence of robust moral responsibility, so I reject determinism. If it turns out that I am wrong, then there was no chance that I could have been committed otherwise, so it’s not like I could have done anything about it. (g)
Comment by Jacob J — July 17, 2007 @ 11:28 am
P Nielsen,
By the way, in #61 I asked you about when and where you think possibilities arise/exist, but I never got an answer. Your #72 still fails to answer this central question, so I remain confused about what you are thinking of when you talk about possible worlds.
Comment by Jacob J — July 17, 2007 @ 11:31 am
Dear Jacob,
Fair enough. I personally think such a nice mapping does *not* exist also. In fact, I think some of you probably know (intuitively) why, and may be able to explain it to me.
You asked earlier:
In my view, there are many places possibility can exist. Usually, I use it in reference to logical possibility (that which is not necessitated by logic). I think we can agree that it is logically possible for me to (eventually) steal a penny.
Where do you situate possibility?
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 17, 2007 @ 11:40 am
P Nielsen,
Usually, I use it in reference to logical possibility
In #60 you said that “‘possible worlds’ come in when defining power.” If you are referring to logical possibilities, how does this help define power (and thereby help support moral responsibility)? The fact that something is logically possible doesn’t imply that it is in my power to bring it about. Frankly, I don’t see how logical possibilities help with the problem of responsibility at all.
Where do you situate possibility?
The only three places I can think of to place possibilities are (1) at the big bang, which we agreed is not sufficient (#60 again), (2) random events such as those in some formulations of QM, which I think we will easily agree are not sufficient, and (3) choices, which is where LFW says possibilities exist, but compatibilists disagree.
So, if you agree that responsibility is tied to power (as we seemed to agree on earlier) and power is defined in terms of possibilities (which you suggested yourself), then the only option I see which supports moral responsibility is (3). Is there an option I have neglected?
Comment by Jacob J — July 17, 2007 @ 11:58 am
Dear Jacob,
Here is how I might begin to define power.
Power is the ability to bring about, in a possible world, a certain outcome (where the outcome doesn’t depend on the free actions of others). I’ll give a few examples outlining my idea.
1) Suppose Tom is in a room. He wants to get out. He goes over to the door, and exits.
Clearly, in this example, Tom has the power to exit the room. In a possible world (in fact, the real world) he brought about the desired outcome.
2) Suppose Tom is in a locked room. He wants to get out. He tries the door, but it is locked. He tries kicking the door, but it is too sturdy.
Clearly, in this example, Tom does not have the power to exit the room. Further, there are no possible worlds (with exactly the same starting conditions–Tom locked in the room, as he exists at time t) in which he is able to open the door.
3) Tom is in a room, which isn’t locked. He doesn’t desire to open the door, and dies of starvation in the room.
In this example, under my definition of power, Tom had the power to leave the room, because in a possible world (with the same starting conditions) he could have left (as in example 1). He just chose not to, in the real world.
4) Tom is locked in a room. The lock is controlled by a mad scientist who has programmed it to unlock for .2 seconds and then lock again, every 35 minutes. Tom tries the door, and it won’t open. He desires to get out. But he just doesn’t happen to try the door when it is unlocked.
Again, under my definition, Tom does have the power to leave the room (even if he thinks otherwise).
5) An evil scientist has implanted Tom’s brain with a device to make him never desire to open the door.
Under my definition, Tom does not have the power to leave the room.
6) An evil scientist has implanted Tom’s brain with a device, which the scientist controls. The scientist is currently undecided what to do, but later lets Tom leave.
Under my definition, Tom did not have the power to leave the room [even though he did leave] untill the scientist made his decision.
Anyway, you get the idea. Feel free to poke holes in it.
First, yes you have neglected the possibility that ‘possibilities’ refers to ‘possible worlds’.
Second, I’m not sure I understand what you mean by your option 3. Could you clarify?
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 17, 2007 @ 5:51 pm
P. Nielsen,
Do you believe any of your 1-6 help you defend your claim that there can be real moral responsibility even if the future is fixed? If so I don’t see how.
Also, Jacob’s option (3) simply asserts that LFW exists and that agents really are free to choose between open options. What part of that needs clarification?
Comment by Geoff J — July 17, 2007 @ 6:11 pm
P. Nielsen: Power is the ability to bring about, in a possible world, a certain outcome (where the outcome doesn’t depend on the free actions of others)..
This won’t work for the kind of freedom at issue. For one thing, even rocks have such power. A rock could roll down a hill and bring about a land slide. That isn’t freedom in the relevant sense.
Further, I believe that Jacob is right. In some possible world I can move my foot even though a 300 pound rock is on it. However, that kind of possibility doesn’t entail that I have power to move my foot with a 300 pound rock on it in the actual world. So it seems that what powers are relevant to free will are local world powers — those that we have under the same circumstances as the actual world where given the history of the world up to t and can still either a or not-a at t.
Comment by Blake — July 17, 2007 @ 6:20 pm
Dear Geoff,
No. I was just giving some scenarios. If you find specific flaws/weaknesses in my definition, feel free to point them out.
But what *are* these mysterious options that play a central role in the definition of LFW? Are they not two different *possibilities* for the future? One cannot define possibilities in terms of LFW, and then define LFW in terms of possibilities.
So, the part that needs clarifying, in my mind, is the resolution of this apparent circularity. Where does possibility really lie?
Cheers
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 17, 2007 @ 7:40 pm
Dear Blake,
I was defining power, not freedom. One is necessary (but not sufficient) for the other. At least that is how I understand it.
For example, electrons have the power to power my home, but I do not (necessarily) suppose they have significant freedom.
Explain how you believe that is possible (given the same state of affairs, that obtain at time t). Are you saying that there is a possible world where, even with all of the observations we have made, it is not contradictory for a man of your stature and muscle make-up to life a 300 pound rock with his foot? Some sort of ‘change of physics’? If so, that would be covered by my “doesn’t depend…on others” with the appropriate modifications, would it not? Or maybe there are no appropriate modifications, and I am implicitly assuming the universe obeys certain laws. I’ll have to give it some thought.
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 17, 2007 @ 7:58 pm
P. Nielsen: Since possible worlds track merely logical possibility, there is no contradiction in a person of my height and strength lifting a 300 pound rock in some possible world (this follows simply from the logical nature of possible worlds). Now it is clearly nomically impossible for a person under the same circumstances that I exist to lift a 300 pound rock — but that is just my point. If the laws change (so that gravity on earth is like on the moon of Mars Phobos), then I could lift a 300 pound rock.
It is not enough to give some necessary conditions for freedom (like being alive, being conscious and so forth), you must provide necessary and sufficient condition for free will and show that they don’t require LFW. Giving non-sufficient conditions (of which there are an infinite number) is just avoiding the issue at issue.
Possibility lies in the power to choose A or not-A, or to choose X or Y, or to choose A, B C, … among a range of options.
Comment by Blake — July 17, 2007 @ 8:32 pm
P. Nielsen: But what *are* these mysterious options that play a central role in the definition of LFW?
There are no mysterious options. There are only intuitive and obvious options. Like your choice to respond to me at all. You did not have to but you freely chose to do so. Or your free choice to bold only the word options.
However, if the future is fixed you had no choice in any of those matters. You were predestined to respond to me with those exact words and at that exact moment before you were even born. And you had no choice but to bold the word options even though you were under the illusion that you could choose otherwise. (Just as I would be predestined to respond to you just this way in just this moment.) That is the type of universe a fixed future gives us and that is totally incompatible with the restored gospel.
In other words, if the future is fixed (as required by your preferred simple foreknowledge) there are no legitimate “possibilities” at all.
Comment by Geoff J — July 17, 2007 @ 9:33 pm
Is the future fixed? It is to God. He knows what’s going to happen. That’s why he never does anything out of anger. God is not going to drown the earth in a flood without knowing that he’s going to do it way in advance. So, no reason for Him to be angry while flooding the earth. He know’s how it’s gonna turn out. If you were God and you knew the eternal progression of every person that you drowned in the flood.. it might be a happy moment. Or just a moment.
Noah is gonna tell the world that God is angry with them because the prophet Noah is a person and that’s how people think. Prophets talk to us in the language we understand. Fear is a great factor to consider. But I can’t see how God could ever be angry with anything if He knows past, present and future of everything. What’s there to be mad about. I find hope and possibility in the that fact that God knows where I’m going to end up. That he loves me and I can never make him angry. I don’t feel as though my future is fixed, but there is no doubt that God has known since the beginning where I’m going to end up…. if there is an end to enertity.
Comment by JoeyG — July 17, 2007 @ 10:03 pm
P. Nielsen,
The difference is that in LFW there are real alternative possibilities and in determinism there are not.
A real possibility is one that might actually come to pass. An alternative possibility is one that is genuinely uncertain (i.e. does not have a truth value yet).
Logical possibilities are irrelevant. It is logically possible the moon is made of green cheese, but that gives no guidance as to what the moon is really made of.
In a deterministic world, every contingency is either certain or impossible. The man may have apparent ability to leave the room at 4:00. He may have apparent ability to stay. However, if he actually leaves the room at 4:00 we know for certain that he lacked the power to stay, and if he stays we know for certain that he lacked the power to leave. There are no alternative possibilities in determinism, no power to do otherwise.
Comment by Mark D. — July 17, 2007 @ 10:25 pm
JoeyG,
I think you are wrong. Further, I think that if you were right the entire gospel and Plan of Salvation as we understand it would be a sham. Further, if you were right God would be as predestined as all of us are and no one would be free to choose anything.
Comment by Geoff J — July 17, 2007 @ 10:27 pm
The same constraints apply to any world governed by simple foreknowledge, by the way, just for a different reason. Either way the future is settled, and thus no alternative possibilities, and no power to do other than what might as well be already captured on film and shipped to the distributors.
Comment by Mark D. — July 17, 2007 @ 10:36 pm
Blake,
There are two easy ways then to salvage my definition.
Option 1: Restrict “possible worlds” to “nomically similar, possible worlds”.
Option 2: Define power relative to classes of possible worlds. So, for example, you wouldn’t have power to move your foot in possible worlds which are nomically similar to our own.
I am not trying to avoid the issue. I am, however, participating in a 4-1 conversation, with people who are more knowledgable (and have conversed more often) on this subject. Therefore, I only biting what I can chew. I may get around to formulating my definition of freedom, but for the present I think I will restrict my attention to the issue of “possibilities” (and related issues) until I understand where everyone is coming from.
I don’t find this is a good definition. Firstly, because we speak of possiblities which we do not have the power to bring about. Secondly, because I am not sure how you are quantifying your statement. Are you saying the power to choose “A or not-A”, or the power to (”choose A” or “choose not-A”) or the power to choose A, or the power to choose not-A. (Do you see these as significantly different options?)
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 18, 2007 @ 7:22 am
A very interesting debate. I need to give it more thought and ask myself some tough questions. The concept of free will and choice taught to me was always in relationship to this world. My life here. Not before or after. I was always told that we don’t know how it works on the other side.. so don’t worry about it. It’s almost like we stop choosing after this life is over, Which can’t be true.
It seems like conformity is the ultimate goal for the righteous and i find that troubling.
Comment by JoeyG — July 18, 2007 @ 7:31 am
Mark and Geoff,
I see your posts as being similar enough that I’d like to respond to them together.
Geoff said: There are no mysterious options. There are only intuitive and obvious options. Like your choice to respond to me at all. You did not have to but you freely chose to do so. Or your free choice to bold only the word options.
The reason I used the word mysterious is two-fold. Firstly, because when I think of options/possibilities/choices, I think in terms of possible worlds and logical possiblities (suitably modified by words like “nomically similar”). This is the “intuitive and obvious” definition, from my point of view. However, none of you seem to be using this definition. So, it isn’t clear to me what definition you are using.
Secondly, there is this (seemingly) circular method of defining possiblities, as mentioned in my previous post to you.
I think you are making the modal fallacy. Check out: http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/modal_fallacy.htm Just because you will do what you do, does not mean you must do so necessarily. A fixed future doesn’t imply you don’t have choice (at least, it isn’t *obviously* the case). I think you need to throw some sort of determinism into the mix as well.
Now, to the real *meat*. Geoff you said: In other words, if the future is fixed (as required by your preferred simple foreknowledge) there are no legitimate “possibilities” at all. Mark, you said: A real possibility is one that might actually come to pass. Notice what both of you have done. You have added qualifying words to the term possibilities, namely ‘legitimate’ and ‘real’. What do you mean by the word without the qualifiers? (Then we can discuss what you mean by the qualifiers.)
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 18, 2007 @ 7:41 am
P. N. With respect to possible worlds, if we limit the worlds in question to those nomically similar then it defeats your view of compatibilism since we don’t have power to change the past or the nomically similar laws that obtain. Now the entire concept of possible worlds becomes problematic because what we mean is not logically possible, but what is possible given the kinds of natural laws that obtain in the actual world. So determinism follows and we don’t have any power to do other that what is entailed by the conjunction of past facts and nomic laws.
Second, I was not quantifying anything since I didn’t make any statements or propositions. I am merely stating the types of choices over which our possible choices range since that is what you asked for. The choices range over contraries (a or or not-a), over alternatives (x or y) or over a larger range of choices than a binary alternative (a, b, c, ….). That is an exhaustive list. Whether we actually have power to bring about such choices is a different question. But the range of possibilities is different than the range of possibilities that are up to us to bring about by our choices.
Comment by Blake — July 18, 2007 @ 7:43 am
P. Nielsen: If you limit necessity to merely nomic and logical necessity, then your position is well-taken. However, these are not the only types of necessity. The argument from foreknowledge turns on “past necessity,” or the notion that none of us, not even God, has power to change the past. If a past state of affairs entails a future states of affairs, then the future state of affairs is just as fixed and beyond our power to change as the past state of affairs. This is what is called “power entailment” in the philosophical literature.
So if God infallibly foreknows in 2,000 B.C. that I will rob a 7-Eleven on 18 July 2007 at 10:01 a.m., then this past fact is not something that I can change because it entails that I will rob when God knows that I will. If God knows this fact because the future is already before him to see in some sense, then everything in the future is just as fixed and beyond our power to alter or change as the fact that God knew these things.
Comment by Blake — July 18, 2007 @ 7:53 am
Blake,
First, I think I may have slightly abused the term “compatibilism” earlier, to give you the mistaken impression that that I believe in full determinism. Second, I am undecided about whether nomical laws cannot be changed (or affected) by us (at least some of them).
Thanks for the clarification. [I was thinking you were using "power" and "choose" as quantifiers.]
I am undecided about whether time is linear. However, I’m not sure that saves me from this issue, because I also favor the idea that we can’t change anything (in the strong sense of the word “change”). I’ll give this some thought and reply later.
I agree. We don’t have the power to alter or change things that will happen, under this scenario. One of the reasons, I suppose, that I’m not (yet) an LFWist is that I haven’t seen a convincing argument that power to *change* things (as opposed to the power to do them) is important for true freedom. Could you give me your argument why such a power is important?
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 18, 2007 @ 8:27 am
P Nielsen: Just because you will do what you do, does not mean you must do so necessarily.
As Blake just pointed out, this is incorrect. If God knows I will rob a 7-11 tomorrow then it is a fact and I have no power to change it. Even if I knew that was my fate I would have no power to change it. If I had power to change it then God wouldn’t know it would happen after all. (BTW - This very problem was played out interestingly in the movie 12 Monkeys.)
What do you mean by the word [possibilities] without the qualifiers?
I mean “no possibilities”.
Could you give me your argument why such a power is important?
I’ll quickly give you mine. As noted earlier if God knew I were fated to rob a 7-11 tomorrow I would have no power to choose or think or do otherwise. I would have been predestined and fated to rob that 7-11 on that date and time from before the foundation of the world. Therefore how could it is possibly be just for God to judge me for that robbery if I could not opt out of it? If I have no power to do anything else how would I be morally responsible for that action in any way?
So in answer to your question; our having the power to choose between open options is an absolute requirement in the gospel. Without it there is no responsibility, this life is no probation, we are not really free to choose anything, and the notion of a judgment is a sham. That is why the power to choose is so important and why the idea of a fixed future must be theologically jettisoned in my opinion.
Comment by Geoff J — July 18, 2007 @ 9:09 am
JoeyG,
It seems like conformity is the ultimate goal for the righteous and i find that troubling.
I agree, it is troubling to me too. I recently started posting on that topic here and here. You may find the discussion there interesting as you ask yourself those tough questions.
Comment by Jacob J — July 18, 2007 @ 9:11 am
Geoff,
Blake’s argument utilizes “past necessity” arising from foreknowledege. I am not familiar enough with the concept to know whether it also applies to just a “fixed future” (but which God does not know), but I thought it didn’t. Blake, can you clarify?
Next, I asked: What do you mean by the word ‘possibilities’ without the qualifiers?
Your response was: I mean “no possibilities”.
This literally does not make any sense. When you say “real possiblities” you mean “real no possibilities”? No only is this circular, it is self-contradictory.
“Real yibbles are important.”
“What are yibbles?”
“They are no yibbles.”
Cheers.
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 18, 2007 @ 10:09 am
My mistake. I intended to say it means “the opposite of no possibilities”. In other words, the qualifiers used do not change the intended meaning of the word “possibilities”.
Comment by Geoff J — July 18, 2007 @ 10:14 am
Geoff,
Let me check that I am understanding you. It seems that your use of the word “real” is not meant to qualify “possibilities” but rather to point to your dislike of a deterministic world, where you don’t feel possibilities can even exist (possibilities are *unreal* in a deterministic world). Is this correct?
Comment by P. Nielsen — July 18, 2007 @