Rich

First let’s get clear on what the disagreement is. You say that all arguments for “free will” are either “emotional” (whatever that means) or “theological.” I disagreed and offered a number of arguments that I said were neither. Now you shift the disagreement to those that are “not entirely be well supported themselves in terms of public evidence.” Of course the two statements you make are not nearly equivalent. I also want to know what you mean by “public evidence.” However, my arguments did not aim at giving “public evidence” and that is because you raise it here for the first time. Nor did I argue that these arguments were knock-down arguments. However, you then shift the ground once again so that the argument needs to be not merely not emotional (whatever that means) and not theological and public, but also “persuasive to people … [and] really provides any objective reasons for believing in free will.” So the argument must now be a-emotional, a-theological, based on public evidence and also persuasive to people on objective grounds. Such a demand is altogether unreasonable and not what we discussed at all.

However, let’s look at you arguments for why don’t find these arguments persuasive (although it is quite beside the original point we were discussing).

(1) immediate experience of being able to choose one thing or another and the overwhelming sense of having actions that are up to me. Of this you admit: “I agree that we believe actions are up to me and that we choose.” So it seems that you in fact believe that we all believe actions are up to us and that we choose. Surely there must be some explanation for this universal belief? The fact is that we cannot fail to believe it because we experience it directly in the act of choosing. We know that we choose just like we know that we have thoughts. However, you really don’t believe what you assert, for you follow that with: “However belief alone is not a good ground for reality. I believe many things and many of my beliefs are wrong.” So you both believe it and you believe that your belief alone is not sufficient for this belief. Then why do you believe it? Your argument here analogous the standard positivist criterion: “any thing that is not verifiable lacks meaning.” However, that sentence couldn’t have meaning because it cannot be verified. It is self referentially incoherent. Similarly, “I believe I choose and some things are up to me but I don’t believe what I believe is reality.” Huh? Surely something has gone badly wrong here.

What has gone wrong is clear. Surely you are correct that merely believing something doesn’t make it true if what you assert is “I believe that God exists.” However, if the assertion of the belief entails affirming that assertion because it is self-referential, then it cannot be coherently denied. Immediately experiencing something and being unable to coherently deny it is pretty darn good reason to believe it is true. Thus, you end up in the position of “I believe that I am I, but my belief doesn’t mean that I exist,” while overlooking that the assertion doesn’t allow a denial of an “I”. Similarly, “I believe that I choose and what I do is up to me and I must do so” entails that you must believe the assertion is true.

2. The will is perfectly active. Of this you say it is just (1) but weaker. No it isn’t. The fact is that our very notion of the will entails activity and not passivity. If I choose or will something, then I do something. If something causes me to think it or do it, then I am not the one doing it. So the notion that “I will X” entails that the will is perfectly active. This is an argument from Aquinas that deserves a good deal more discussion. However, my sole point is not that it is a knock down argument that you must assent to in order to be rational, but that it ain’t (1) all over again.

3. We are morally responsible. Of this you say: “This pushing the question back a stage without answering it. Moral responsibility depends upon free will but we don’t know that we have moral responsibility in a public, objective way. This is compelling only as a theological or quasi-theological claim …” I don’t believe that this is true at all. There are any number of agnostics and atheists who believe that we are morally responsible and thus must give a (non-theological) account of how we can be responsible. I would like to see the argument that asserts that any sound idea of morality entails theism. In fact I happen to know that you reject that assertion so your position here is incoherent — admittedly in an ad hominem. Further, that we don’t know we have moral responsibility in a “public, objective way” just smacks to me of verificationism and I would reject such a demand out of hand.

(4) the fact that we cannot predict what a person will say do or think even with intimate knowledge of that person. You are correct that unpredictability doesn’t entail free will — so I agree with you that far. However, it does entail that determinism has got some explaining to do about why we cannot predict human actions. Further, my point here was really in response to Jeff G. who claimed that “everything we know about physics” entailed the falsity of LFW.

(5) We deliberate. You assert that it isn’t an argument at all. You are right that in and of itself it is just an observation. The argument is found on pp. 207-08 of the 1st volume to which I referred. That we deliberate entails that we believe that what we do isn’t yet resolved, it us up to us, it depends on how we decide and we have rational control over what we deliberate about that leads to our choice. You don’t deliberate about what isn’t up to you do you? When was the last time that you deliberated about whether you should choose the sun to come up tomorrow or whether to make it so that you were born two years later than you were?

(6) we undertake purposive behavior aimed at a telos which does not yet exist. Well at least Stewart Geotz here: http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1756 and John DePoe here: http://www.johndepoe.com/MindnotMechanism.pdf disagree with you. The reason is obvious. If our choices are the result of prior a-rational causes then we cannot account for the fact of teleological causation of our actions — i.e, we envision a possibility that can be achieved by a number of actions that will create something as yet non-existent and not entailed by the prior causes because unless we freely bring it about it won’t occur. What doesn’t yet exist cannot cause anything in the sense of efficient causation.

(7) we cannot pragmatically live life based on the belief that everything is determined and everything we think, do, say and write was already entailed by the earlier states. I think that you agree with this statement n’est pas? If you do, then you cannot pragmatically be a determinist. You say that this entails only incompatiblism, not LFW. I think that you are correct about that. However, let me press it a but. (8) We also cannot live a coherent mental life believing that we are not responsible and accountable for some of what occurs. That does entail LFW. However, I think that you are correct that (7) doesn’t entail (8) — but I was making a point in relation to Dennett’s claim to the contrary of (7). If you also accept (8), then LFW seems pragmatically required.

What people on both sides should do is consider the merits of each others arguments and point out why they disagree and stop the hack psychoanalysis, pretending to diagnose the defect in others’ minds that leads them to be such idiots. In other words, people on all sides should be saying, “You’re wrong because your argument is weak here and here,” rather than, “You’re wrong because you have incentive to disagree with me.” The latter approach is simply childish.

I’m not sure it is arrogance. But I’d agree it perhaps isn’t the best reasoning. But I don’t think it arrogance to say that when all our objective knowledge takes a certain form we are justified in believing that future knowledge will as well. Induction simply isn’t arrogance.

Now induction can be wrong. But I’m troubled by the claim it is somehow inherently arrogant. I’m much more inclined to see arrogance in assuming our words capture fully the nature of what they refer to.

With regards to the issue of free will and relationships, I’ll be addressing that as I engage with your book. While free will may or may not be true, I’m just not at all persuaded by arguments like (#85).

Put simply, while we may know from experience that we love it isn’t clear that love takes the form you believe it does.

Beliefs can’t simply ground themselves.