485 Comments »

1. Geoff,
   I’ll keep this short, and direct people to my comments on the post at Splendid Sun. I will only say that I agree that fatalism is pernicious, but I don’t think that absolute foreknowledge on God’s part is fatalistic. It is actually our praying, acting, etc, that makes the future that God knows. If we fail to act, then the future will certianly be different whether or not God knows that. If we say, “hey God knows what will happen so why try to change that,” then part of what God will know is that we were going to let ourself fail to act because we are lazy or lack faith [I think these and others are more likely the culprits] and blame it on a belief in foreknowledge. Whatever else we believe, I think we need to believe, as you point out, that the scriptures are telling the truth when they say that our prayers and work are efficacious.

   Comment by Steve H — March 21, 2005 @ 6:52 pm

2. I’ve never heard a rational explanation from anyone on how God could have “exhaustive foreknowledge”, and that we can be free to choose at the same time. People just speak the words and expect you to believe them that it’s the way things are. We were talking about this very subject in class today and one kid said that we need to listen to Isaiah when he say’s “God’s ways are higher than our ways”. Yeah, he pulled the “God’s Ways” card. How is that supposed to prove anything. I think he thought that was proof enough that his position was correct, but really all he’s saying is we cannot say anything about God at all. There is an obvious contradiction here, and I would love to have someone explain to me how they solve this contradiction. Also they might touch on timelessness and how a God who has a body could possibly be timeless. Yeah they pull the “God’s Ways” card on that one too.

   Comment by Craig — March 21, 2005 @ 7:45 pm

3. First, let us not be so hyperbolic, eh? Pernicious? Faith-crippling? It seems that there have been many with great faith that have believed in the absolute foreknowledge of God.

   Clark has raised a good point that there is a difference between knowing factually and empirically. Potentially, for God to act on certain occasions, he must experience love/mercy/supplication. In such instances regardless of whether he knows that we will pray or not, he cannot act until we do. We must therefore act.

   Comment by J. Stapley — March 21, 2005 @ 9:43 pm

4. Steve,

   After my long reply over at Splendid Sun, I think I can follow up here and say that the doctrine of absolute foreknowledge by definition requires the future to be as fixed as the past. If that is the case then we are only under the illusion of being free to choose, but in reality we cannot do anything about anything. So if God sees the future and I will go to hell and he lets me, no amount of effort on my part can change that. It is fixed. That is the very essence of fatalism. That is where “que sera, sera” finds its root. And that is why I reject it as a false and pernicious doctrine — because absolute foreknowledge cannot be separated from a fixed future.

   Craig,

   I couldn’t agree more. The only response to this issue seems to be “God’s ways are not our ways”. But I think we are closer to God than those people are allowing. We are “a little less than the gods” after all. I think this is one of those cases where “that wicked one cometh and taketh away light and truth… because of the tradition of their fathers.” (D&C 93:39)

   Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 21, 2005 @ 9:57 pm

5. Ha! Hey, a little hyperbole sparks conversation, J.

   Fatalism is the actual pernicious part, but fatalism is the natural child of a fixed future, and a fixed future is required for absolute foreknowledge. I think those of great faith who might nominally go for doctrine of absolute foreknowledge probably never gave it a lot of thought so they never actually follow the road to its pernicious conclusion…

   Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 21, 2005 @ 10:03 pm

6. Does not the focus on the empericism negate fatalism while still embracing foreknowlege?

   Comment by J. Stapley — March 21, 2005 @ 10:11 pm

7. Yes. But I think that is only the case because of the complete lack of focus on the doctrine of absolute foreknowledge, which I believe to be false. If it is false that it is by definition unable to support true faith. “…therefore if ye have faith ye hope for things which are not seen, which are true.” (Alma 32:21)

   Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 21, 2005 @ 10:47 pm

8. This topic is actually being discussed at some length (though not at much depth) at http://www.nauvoo.com under the evidence for macroevolution post. I hope they do not mind if I copy some of my comments here with a couple modifications, for I feel they apply:

   My question is what do we mean by omniscient? Do we mean that God knows absolutely everything, everywhere, everything that happened before He became God and everything that will happen ever? This seems to be stretching it. Do we mean that he knows everything that will ever happen to us in this life? That isn’t too bad. Do we mean that he knows everything that can be known? Then the question becomes what can or cannot be known?

   My understanding of God was always as follows.

   Let’s take the conception of God according to the traditional mono-theistic tradtion. He created everything, therefore there was a definite beginning and there will be, more or less, a definite end. Therefore, there are a finite amount of things that can be known and He knows them all.

   Our understanding is different. There was no definite beginning. There will be no definite end. Therefore there is no such thing as “everything” at all. It is impossible, even for God, to know everything because there is not such thing as absolutely everything. Thus we must define what we mean when we say omniscient by placing limitations on it.

   In the ethical monotheistic model, if there are 999 things that can be known, God knows 999 things. In our model, God can know all 999 things but there will always be more. Remember, infinity is a concept, not a number. Thus, we believe in eternal progression.

   Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 22, 2005 @ 12:52 am

9. Jeffrey makes a good point. And it’s not omniscience that I have a problem with, as it is defined here at least. What I have a problem with is exhaustive foreknowledge. Jeff I like your point that since we believe in eternity it is impossible for God to know all of eternity. Has anyone on here (besides me), read Clark Pinnock’s book “The Most Moved Mover”, I think he does an excellent job (though I do not completely agree with him) of explaining God’s omniscience. And he isn’t even a Mormon, he’s an evangelical. Pinnock believes that God chooses to limit his knowledge the moment he creates free individuals. Since we are free, we place limits on God’s knowledge. Now as Mormon’s we believe that we are eternal, and therefore our freedom is eternal as well. If that’s the case, then God doesn’t choose to limit his knowledge, his knowledge is just limited as a matter of fact. And as Jeff pointed out, the only omniscience God can have if this is the case is complete knowledge of all that is actual. Given the Hebrew prophets descriptions of their dealings with God, it seem’s that this would be how they thought of God’s knowledge as well. This type of omniscience is not foreign to Mormonism either. It was taught by Brigham Young, John Taylor, Lorenzo Snow, B.H. Roberts, etc. etc.

   Comment by Craig — March 22, 2005 @ 7:55 am

10. Can’t we agree to disagree? The foreknowledge of God is an impossible question to resolve. If I think that God has an absolute foreknowledge of all my acts, and yet I still have faith, can it really be such a pernicious and faith-crippling doctrine? It is to you, but not to everyone. I don’t think it really matters; in the end, we’ll find out the answer, and both of us will probably be wrong.

    Comment by NFlanders — March 22, 2005 @ 8:01 am

11. NFlanders,
    The point is, one of HAS to be right. We’re not setting up a false dichotomy here. Either God has exhaustive foreknowledge or he doesn’t. There is no middle ground on that. Now those who believe that God doesn’t have exhaustive foreknowledge believe that there is an inherent contradiction in saying that God has exhaustive foreknowledge and that we are free to choose amoung genuine alternatives. If you can demonstrate that this is not a contradiction then you might have a leg to stand on, otherwise you’ll have to keep pulling the Isiah card.

    Comment by Craig — March 22, 2005 @ 8:29 am

12. Jeffrey and Craig: The issues at hand with God’s knowledge and power is — Does he have enough knowledge and power to ensure our salvation and exaltation? If so then all other knowledge and power are superfluous to us. So I agree with that discussion of yours.

    NFlanders: The problem with your sugestion that we stop thinking about this is that it only delays the inevitable. Craig is right — our God either does or doesn’t have absolute foreknowledge. Trying to ignore it is one approach (and most take it) but it is not a useful one. Joseph said:
    

    My first object is to find out the character of the only wise and true God, and what kind of a being he is;

    It seems clear to me that Joseph would have wanted us all to get to the bottom of these vital issues. The risk we run otherwise is building our spiritual houses on the sandy foundation of false doctrines (which include absolute foreknowledge as far as I can tell…)

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 22, 2005 @ 9:21 am

13. I think Blake Ostler lays out the argument very nicely with his “B” argument. It seems almost irrefutable. I think if I get some time later on I’ll post it on here in its entirety.

    Comment by Craig — March 22, 2005 @ 11:42 am

14. I think one thing missing in this type of discussion is the difference between time for God and what we consider time.

    Time to us is always linear, one event happens then another, then another. Time is a function of mass, gravity and speed. Tell me what God’s mass is, what the gravity is where He’s located and what speed He is traveling at and we can understand better what time is to Him.

    I believe God is outside our time domain. Time to God is considerable different than time to us. He can see the end from the begining. If we could change God’s mind / what He will do for us, based on our what we want with our limited knowledge and perspective what does that say about God? What would be the ripple effect of all those changes from God always changing things to suit man’s wants?

    I always thought the purpose of prayer was not to beg God to give us what we want but to align our will and wants with God’s will. I believe it was Neal Maxwell who said the only thing that we can really give to God is our will.

    I think the prayer of faith is more than begging for what we want and then ending with “thy will be done”. And I think God’s foreknowledge has more to do with His perspective in relationship to time itself than we understand.

    Comment by don — March 22, 2005 @ 12:01 pm

15. Don,
    There are several problems with your theory of God and time. First of all, if is true that God is outside of “our” time, then how does he interact with us? What difference would a prayer make? Does he really listen to our prayers, or does he just command us to pray so that we can realize his will and act accordingly? Does this force us into being Deists? Do we have to accept the fact that God created the universe and then stepped back and let it do its thing? It seems that this all goes contrary to what Joseph Smith taught. Joseph’s revelations and teachings teach us that God is immanent in the world, not transcendent to it. God here’s and answer’s prayers, the Bible, and the Book of Mormon teach that our petitionary prayers can actually change God’s mind. We can get into the theories of space, time, speed, etc. But when it comes the scriptures they make it very clear that our prayers do make a difference, and God is immanent in the world.

    Comment by Craig — March 22, 2005 @ 1:05 pm

16. I personally think that the encyclopedia of mormonism’s article on time and eternity is one of it’s best articles:

    “Whatever the subtleties of the ultimate nature of time, or of scientific postulates on the relativity of time, and of the modes of measuring time, several assurances are prominent features of LDS understanding:

    1. Time is a segment of eternity… Time itself had no beginning and will have no end.

    2. Time unfolds in one direction… Individual creative freedom modifies the outcomes.

    3. Eternity, as continuing time, is tensed: past, present, and future. God himself… is… related to time. At his own supreme and unsurpassable level, he has a past, a present, and a future. Neither he nor his creations can return to or change the past.

    4. In a cosmic sense, the reckoning of time is according to the rotations of the spheres… There is some connection between time and space, for example, “one day to a cubit” (see Book of Abraham: Facsimiles From the Book of Abraham, Facsimile 2, Figure 1)…

    The thesis that God is beyond time has sometimes been introduced to account for God’s omniscience or foreknowledge… For Latter-day Saints, as for the Bible, God’s omniscience is “in time.” God anticipates the future. It is “present” before him, but it is still future. When the future occurs, it will occur for the first time to him as to his creatures.”

    I apologize for the long quote, but it makes great points. If God is in time, any time at all, he does not experientially know the future as He does the past. Instead, He predicts it, continually revising His predictions according to what happens in the present.

    I have been exploring this issue rather superficially at the Mormons and Evolution blog (www.mormonevolution.blogspot.com) and its relation to the preexistence. After all, how could each person who is born here today have had all of the physical characteristics that we inherit genetically in the preexistence? Could God have known who each and every person would marry and have children with? I believe not.

    Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 22, 2005 @ 3:17 pm

17. Jeffrey,

    That was excellent. Thank you for the input and for pointing us to that insightful entry in EoM.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 22, 2005 @ 3:30 pm

18. Jeffrey,
    Yes that quote was very helpful in putting this issue into perspective. Many times when one tries to defend exhaustive foreknowledge, they will use theories of relativity to defend their postition, but they never spell out how the theory of relativity gives grounds for believing in divine foreknowledge. (This is probably because they lack an understanding of relativity). I think the encyclopedia does a good job of summing up Mormonism’s view of time and reality.

    Comment by Craig — March 22, 2005 @ 3:40 pm

19. Graig,
    At the risk of responding for Don,I think the answer to most of your questions is no. Just because I may believe that God does not relate to time in the same way that we do, doesn’t mean that God doesn’t relate to time.
    Geoff,
    If it helps you to ease your mind in respect to my sandy foundation ;), I am very willing to concede that God’s knowledge of the future may, and probably does, only extend as far as this world (Of course, there may be contemporaneously operating worlds, and I don’t want to go there.). This does help me to account for statements by Briham Young and others that God is still progressing in knowledge. I’ll probably cross-post this comment on Splendid Sun.

    Comment by Steve H. — March 22, 2005 @ 3:41 pm

20. Steve,
    I’m fine with the fact that you believe that God has exhaustive foreknowledge. I may even be wrong on this subject, trust me it won’t be the first time. If you can demonstrate scripturally and intellectualy that this is the case, then I’ll give your position some thought. This has never been done adequately for me. For me the only reasonable position to take is the position that God’s knowledge is contingent upon our free acts, and this position is in harmony with scripture. But please, in all sincereity, please show me how my reasoning may be faulty.

    Comment by Craig — March 22, 2005 @ 4:21 pm

21. Because God is outside our time domain doesn’t mean he doesn’t or can’t relate to us in our time domain. The space time continum shows that time is different relative to where you are at, the scriptures even point out this fact. If God is in a different sphere of time, or relates to time differently than I do certainly doesn’t mean he won’t hear my prayers, can’t answer my prayers, or can’t come and visit me.

    I just think we know so little about time - God’s time etc. What does from eterntiy to eternity mean? Or one eternal round? both those relate to time, but I don’t have a clue what they mean.

    Comment by don — March 22, 2005 @ 4:48 pm

22. Don,
    I agree. We shouldn’t of course, imply that we can’t know anything about God, and thus use the “God’s ways card” every time we have no explanation. (I’m not sure I like that metaphor, actually, but it’ll work) But certainly there are those doctrines that we don’t (and can’t) completely understand, and what I think you point out is that our limited understanding of time and of God’s relationship to it might make this one of them.
    Craig,
    For now, I’ll direct you to my comments on the subject at Splendid Sun listed above. We went through most of my feelings on the matter for now. You can decide what you find persuasive there.

    Comment by Steve H — March 22, 2005 @ 6:59 pm

23. Don, Steve: Blake dealt with this time issue well in his book too. It seems to me that God’s relationship to time is really moot. If he sees and knows the future already then the future is as fixed as the past. If the future (or his will) is fixed, pernicious fatalism natually follows.

    Our scriptures regarding time do say that it is measure differently on different planets/places, though. Measuring time differently is easy to understand to me — I have measured time differently in my life too. When I was young it seemed very slow. The older I get the faster it seems to get.

    Craig,

    The problem is that there is no logical way to allow for both true free agency and absolute foreknowledge. One either must pull the “God’s way card” or conclude that God’s foreknowledge necessarily has limits. You and I are obviously in the same latter on this subject.

    The thing that surprises me — and maybe someone in the absolute foreknowledge camp can help me out here — is how tenaciously many of the saints cling to the doctrine absolute foreknowledge even when it can be logically shown to not be necessary for God to exalt us… Our exaltation is God’s only concern (D&C 1:39) so it ought to be our only real concern too. If he can get us exalted without absolute foreknowledge then why cling to it?

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 22, 2005 @ 9:51 pm

24. BTW — There is a third discussion on this subject going on over at Clark’s blog.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 22, 2005 @ 9:55 pm

25. Geoff,
    I’ve been toying with a thought. It may be a biased thought, and it may be ad hominem attack, but I’m going to throw it out there anyway. I was talking to my wife about this today, and about the purpose of prayer. Many who belong to the exhaustive foreknowledge camp, believe that our prayers are there to bring our will in subjection with God’s will. I have some tell me that the belief that our prayers change God’s mind, or somehow affect the future in a way that it changes out comes is a selfish way to pray. But as I thought about it today, it’s the other way around. If you think that praying to God does not affect God, but only affects yourself, then in all actuality that is the selfish way to pray. I think that believing that prayer is an interactive, give and take relationship, between you and God is a much better way to pray. But I don’t know, what do you think?

    Comment by Craig — March 22, 2005 @ 11:00 pm

26. Geoff,
    I think this is how my previous post is best viewed, as an explanation of why I believe in foreknowledge based on the idea that I feel it is necessary to other doctrines, including the idea that God must have it to have the necessary knowledge to exalt us. I may be wrong, but it is on this basis that I see the doctrine as necessary, and as I do not see it as logically untennable, despite multiple readings of Blake’s Argument B–lots, I assure you–I see no reason to disbelieve in God’s foreknowledge and reasons to believe in it.
    Craig,
    I would agree that our prayers are efficacious, despite the fact that I am in the foreknowledge camp, due mostly to the fact that I do not see foreknowledge as fatalistic. I think, however, that our prayers should still seek for God’s will. That is, the scriptures do warn us ot to pray for that which is improper, and we should seek the spirit to know what we should pray for, thus making me into one of those people that would think that we shouldn’t pray for what we want, but for what God wants, but I do still believe that if we don’t pray, the blessings won’t come.

    Comment by Steve H — March 23, 2005 @ 12:15 am

27. Craig,

    The subject you bring up is a vital one. I posted on it earlier this month. The upshot of that discussion is that neither approach — seeking desired blessing (via changing God’s mind) vs. seeking to conform to his will — is more selfish than the other. I proposed that in order to change God’s mind and get our desired blessing we must barter in God’s currency. God’s currency is our will. So in order to get our desired blessing we must conform our will to his (or in other words we repent and work toward his goals for us, aka exaltation). It becomes the ultimate win-win deal.

    If there is anything to find fault with the approach of only conforming to his will without ever seeking to change it is that we may miss out on all sorts of possible blessing. I suspect that the deists have some things right - that the world chugs along indenpently most of the time and God only intervenes upon request (or when he must for his own purposes). If we don’t bother to ask with sufficient fervor and faith for what we need and want God may not be able to give us some of the blessing that are only available only upon request. In other words, changing God’s mind might mean getting him to intervene when he otherwise would have let “nature take its course”.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 23, 2005 @ 12:45 am

28. Fair enough, Steve. I guess the problem is you don’t buy various arguments on how God could bring about our exaltation without absolute foreknowledge. I certainly don’t begrudge you that belief.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 23, 2005 @ 12:50 am

29. “Our exaltation is God’s only concern (D&C 1:39) so it ought to be our only real concern too. If he can get us exalted without absolute foreknowledge then why cling to it?” –#23 Geoff
    One could pose the exact same question back to you and Craig. Why cling to your belief in the limited knowledge of God if it isn’t necessary for exaltation? Personally, I don’t really care one way or the other. My tentative belief in foreknowledge is quite different from what you and Craig imagine it to be. I believe we can ask God for and receive things that we wouldn’t have gotten otherwise. I believe we have absolute free agency and can do anything we want. But I also think that God already knows what choices we will make.
    Obviously, this issue is important to you and I don’t begrudge your trying to get to the bottom of it. But to label foreknowledge unilaterally as “false doctrine” seems both rash and dangerous.

    Comment by NFlanders — March 23, 2005 @ 8:38 am

30. But to label foreknowledge unilaterally as “false doctrine” seems both rash and dangerous.

    Ha! Perhaps you are right about that, NFlanders. But as Craig mentioned, this is one of those binary things… it is either true or not. I just happen to be taking a stand on it even when most others won’t. I feel pretty confident that God won’t begrudge me trying to avoid being lukewarm on this particular doctrine, though (even in the off-chance I am wrong…)

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 23, 2005 @ 8:55 am

31. Steve,
    You have read the “B” argument several times. I still haven’t had time to post it on here because I’m so busy, but since you have already read it several times, can you tell us if it is an invalid argument, and if it’s not, can you tell us which premise you disagree with?

    Comment by Craig — March 23, 2005 @ 9:14 am

32. If God doesn’t have complete foreknowledge how can He inspire the prophets to write prophecy? Without complete foreknowledge how did he know that Joseph in Egypt would have a decendant named Joseph with a son named Joseph who would be in the right place at the right time to be the prophet of the restoration?

    Comment by don — March 23, 2005 @ 11:18 am

33. Geoff: But as Craig mentioned, this is one of those binary things… it is either true or not.
    Is it possible that this is not necessarily so? Perhaps what I think of as foreknowledge and what you think of as not having it are equally wrong simply because language is inadequate to express the true reality. Perhaps God could say, “I have foreknowledge.” I’m not claiming he would (though I often do), just that he could. It might be true, but mean something that we can’t express. That is, it might be possible, however counterintuitive that there is actually something that such a binary might not fit.
    Even as I am writing this I don’t know if I even think it is a possibility, but you must understand that one of my principle studies as a student and scholar of romanticism is transcendence. So I’m probably more comfortable than most with the idea that there are things that defy logic, and I perhaps look for the places where my ability to logically think through an issue might be inadequate.

    Comment by Steve H — March 23, 2005 @ 11:19 am

34. Don, your question is even more harsh than that, so much so that I’m not even sure any Mormon will want to accept it. That prophecy says that not only would a boy named Joseph be called to be prophet, but that he would not choose to turn away from it. Now we know that Joseph Smith knew about this prophecy. Can we find any better example of a prophecy, supposedly coming from an absolute foreknowledge, taking away somebodies free will. Joseph Smith had no choice but to continue with his calling. The future was set and he had no say in the matter.

    Regarding you argument however, I would bring in three things: 1) prophecies regarding what God would do in the future do not limit anybodies free will and are OK. Just like my prophecying that I will go to church this sunday isn’t all that impressive. 2) We should critically view prophecies which are related after the fact of fulfillment. The recollection of the original prophecy will be viewed and remembered in terms of its fulfillment. This also makes for really good faith promoting, though not entirely historically accurate, material. 3) Closely related to (2), it would be wise, especially in Don’s example, to consider Ostler’s “Modern Expansion of an Ancient Source” theory. Namely, that a lot of Joseph Smith can be found in both the BoM and the JST making many prophecies posthumorous and falling under #2.

    I think if we had an accurate accout of what, exactly, a prophecy was when given and then compared it with an independant, though accurate, account of its fulfillment and I fear that the two may not match up as well as we sometimes suppose.

    Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 23, 2005 @ 11:37 am

35. History is always written by the winners. So I agree with your look at prophecy fulfillment. But the assumption that foreknowledge takes away free will is still not something I’m in total agreement with. There are several bible prophecies that are accurate to the day/year of their fulfillment. Something to consider about many prophecies is the exact expression that the person involved has free will. Two quick examples: Cain - if thou doest well, ok, if not then….And Laman and Lemuel if then statements about them and their future. Hmmmmm, maybe that’s just an easy out for God.

    Comment by don — March 23, 2005 @ 11:57 am

36. Jeffrey,
    Are you suggesting that God would have Joseph go back and write himself into prophecy? It doesn’t sound very god-like to me. How is this different from me going back and rewriting what I said last week to make it seem like I knew what would happen to me? Forgive me if I haven’t read that particular part of Blake’s work.
    I still tend to have trouble with this view of prophecy as something that might happen. How, then, would we explain Deuteronomy 18:22:

    When a prophet speaketh in the name of the LORD, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the LORD hath not spoken, but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously: thou shalt not be afraid of him.

    Comment by Steve H — March 23, 2005 @ 1:35 pm

37. Don: You ask an important question. For some of my reponses to it see here, here, and here (response to Steve and follow up comments).

    Steve: As we have talked about before, the problem isn’t with foreknowledge, it is with a fixed future. I do think it is impossible to have absolute foreknowledge without a fixed future. But I think it is quite possible to have a what could be called non-absolute-foreknowledge without the future being fixed. Perhaps it is small difference but I think it is important.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 23, 2005 @ 1:51 pm

38. 1) I don’t believe that Joseph went back and put his name into scripture de novo. There might have been a prophecy there to which Joseph was the fulfillment and from there Joseph filled in the rest.

    2) I don’t think that he necessarily did this consciously. I think it is just part of the very “conceptual” process of translation as JS understood it.

    3) With regards to Deuteronomy, it was not written by Moses but by priests who were very concerned about maintaining strict orthodoxy and keeping pesky prophets at bay. I think the verse contains sound advice, but I wouldn’t take it too literally. After all, many of JS’s prophecies didn’t come true, are we really sure we want to adopt this verse?

    Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 23, 2005 @ 2:29 pm

39. Geoff, are you saying that God can have a perfect foreknowledge when it comes to fufilling specific prophecies, like Joseph Smith exampled in my previous comment. And He can do that thru prompting and invitations by the spirit….just to make sure it comes out right?

    It appears to me that there is a fixed future when it comes to certain prophecies, if so then does He fix it?

    If it’s not a fixed future then how can He know His prophecies will come true, unless thru His influence He guarantees it?

    I have a hard time getting my limited intellegence, earthly, finite mind around this…especially when you throw in time as it relates to God and this question.

    Comment by don — March 23, 2005 @ 3:23 pm

40. Don,
    There are few passages of scripture that are specific. Comb through the Book of Mormon and you’ll notice a trend of “conditional” prophecies. As a rule of thumb, this is typical for prophecies, even if the prophecy isn’t padded with qualifications as such. For example, the Lord told Joseph that the temple would be built in Jackson County Missouri, “in this generation”, now you can go about trying to define what “generation” means, but it is obvious what it means when you read the scripture that explains why the temple was not built. Now the revelation did not say, “if you are faithful, and if the enemies of the Lord don’t interfere, you will build a temple in Jackson country missiouri in this generation”. He didn’t have to because that those types of restrictions are implied in every revelation. Many of the revelations that God gives that seem to be absolute usually have something to do with his divine action. For example Christ being born in 600 years. That is God’s action, so he can make such promises. I don’t know how to deal with the Joseph Smith scripture, but Jeffrey might have something with the “conceptual process” of translation. I mean it is obvious that the Book of Mormon is not a perfect word for word translation. Biblical passages that are repeated word for word in the Book of Mormon are later corrected in the JST.

    Well I could ramble on and on, but the point is…just because there are prophecies that seem to require specific foreknowledge, it does not follow that all foreknowledge is that specific, which is the real issue we’re dealing with here. For you to demonstrate that God has “exhaustive foreknowledge” would have to show in every instance God’s prophecies were fulfilled, and he knew fully in advance what the outcome would be. We have the easier task, all we have to show is one time where God’s prophecy was conditional and he didn’t know exhuastively what the outcome would be and we’ve demonstrated that God’s foreknowledge is not exhaustive. Now, we have several examples, not just one. So how will you deal with these examples?

    Comment by Craig — March 23, 2005 @ 3:46 pm

41. Don: That is also a good question. A fixed future means that, for example, God knows you will blink at 10:37:14.5 tonight. It is a fact that he knows as if it already happened and there is nothing you or He could do to change that — it is fixed. This is the problem with that doctrine.

    God being able to prophesy does not require the future to be fixed. For instance, God could tell Joseph of Egypt about actions of two future Josephs and be certain it will happen. Why? First the world is already scripted out and planned ahead of time and Heisenberg gives a model of predicting group behavior very accurately. (See the former post and this one.) Second, God knows both of those “future” Josephs already and their progenitors. He knows when to send each of them to earth and he knows their character well enough to know they are the type of people who will heed promptings from the Holy Ghost. So there is wiggle room on timing and details but God has plenty of power and predictive capability to see to it that prophecies generally happen as he predicts.

    As I said, this is very different than being locked into an unchangeable or fixed script.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 23, 2005 @ 4:03 pm

42. In this specific instance, I’d say God wanted the Saints to work towards building a temple even though He knew it wouldn’t come to fruition.
    Just because He knows how the book ends doesn’t mean he’s not going to give us the full complement of choices.

    Comment by NFlanders — March 23, 2005 @ 4:09 pm

43. Craig,
    I think that the point about prophesy for those of us that believe in what you are calling exhaustive foreknowledge, though I don’t know that I have thought through the term entirely, is that there are certain prophesies that are fulfilled so specifically that they seem to have required either coersion or foreknowledge by some other means. If by some other means, why wouldn’t he use those means in every case? If by coersion, what justifies his coersion in those cases–can it be just to coerce one person into doing good or evil so for the good of others?
    I’m not saying you believe any of these things, just outlining my reasoning.

    Comment by Steve H — March 23, 2005 @ 4:11 pm

44. Steve, I cannot think of a more explicit example of specific prophecy as you mention than Peter denying Christ thrice. I mean Peter denied it would happen and yet within 24 hours it did. (If this isn’t the most extreme case let me know). Anyway, that is the very case I dealt with in my original foreknowledge post called “How God could figure out the future without foreknowledge”. Check it out. The point is that if I can come up with a model where God could get make accurate prophecies without seeing a fixed future surely He could!

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 23, 2005 @ 4:28 pm

45. Geoff,
    I don’t think it’s necessary to explain away such examples when the scriptures are full of contrary examples.

    Comment by Craig — March 23, 2005 @ 4:45 pm

46. Geoff,
    The question is, did he know that Peter would fail? Yes. Did that take away Peter’s choice? No. Peter had the choice here that was the subject of the prediction, I think. You see, saying that foreknwoledge is incompatible with free-will would mean that God did not know what Peter would do, and if he did know what Peter would do, Peter had no choice but to do it. If he did not know what Peter would do, why tell him that he would do it rather than simply saying “Peter, before the cock crows, you will probably deny me,” or “you will almost surely deny me,” instaed of making the outright prediction? Saying that God’s foreknowledge simply comes from his understanding of the agents choosing seems awfully like saying he has exhaustive foreknowledge, since I know many who have made a claim to exhaustive foreknowledge on this basis-he knows us so well that he knows what we will do in any situation, and the actions of agenst would be the only things difficult to predict-though I’m not sure that’s the model of exhaustive foreknowledge I buy into, since it seems to me to make us less like autonomous agents and less like people who just act as we do because of who we are–our genetic or spiritual make-up or our training.

    Comment by Steve H — March 23, 2005 @ 4:46 pm

47. My goodness, Craig got to that before I did. Are we all sitting and waiting for someone to post?

    Comment by Steve H — March 23, 2005 @ 4:48 pm

48. Steve,
    First..Yes I’m sitting here waiting to see if someone posts. I’m stuck at the Wilkenson Center because I accidently kept the keys to the car, so now my wife can’t pick me up. So now I have to wait for the Bus.

    Second,
    I buy into neither model of exhuasitive foreknowledge (i.e. God see’s the absolute future, or God knows us so well he knows what we will do). I think God does know us well, and I think he does see some future events, but I do not believe that his foreknowledge is exhaustive. As far as the prophecy about Peter, I just throw my arms up and say, I don’t know how the heck Jesus knew that. What Ostler says may have some truth to it; we must bear in mind the gospels were written long after the fact, and I doubt they wanted to focus on prophecy’s that didn’t come true, I mean look at the prophecy’s that Joseph prophecied that didn’t come true, do those make it into our preisthood manuals? But like I said before, regardless of how many examples you can come up with, I only have to come up with one counter example to throw off your whole theory.

    Comment by Craig — March 23, 2005 @ 5:01 pm

49. Steve and Craig: I think that approach I took is useful because it sits between the poles you two are at. Craig says (and is correct, I think) that some prophesies just don’t come true. Steve doesn’t believe Christ would have told Peter that if there was any chance it might not come true. I think Craig is more right in this case, only because there was a logical possibility that the prophesy to Peter may not have come true. But I like the model because it describes a way God could be right almost all the time — which I think is the way things really are.

    I think you misread my take on that case too, Steve. You seem to think I am implying some sort of causal determinism and I am not. Knowing Peter’s character was not enough. God used that knowledge in addition to prompting various players to accuse Peter, etc. It required direct intervention combined with knowledge of character to pull this off.

    As to why Christ didn’t mention there was a one in a million (or billion or whatever) chance that the prophesy might not come to pass, I think it was just not needed. God would have had a backup plan for that unlikely contingency too. As long as the overall plan is accomplished why should he sweat a minor setback?

    BTW — I came up with this model in response to Ostler’s anemic answer “maybe that scripture is wrong”. That doesn’t work for me and with the model I provided we don’t have to settle for claiming scripture was wrong. (For what it’s worth, Blake appreciated my alternate model on the subject when he read it.)

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 23, 2005 @ 5:13 pm

50. Geoff: First, I fail to see how your response differs from my view that God knows all probabilities and can intervene to assure his purposes? Our views are virtually indistinguishable, so no wonder I agree with you. However, I reject your view of what appears to me to be scriptural inerrancy. You assert that the scripture cannot be wrong and that amounts to inerrancy. That is not an LDS position — and what do you make of God predicting a temple to be built in Independence in this generation and then revoking his prophecy? What do you make of Christ’s prediction that God’s kingdom would be established on this earth even before all the 70 returned from their missions? What do you make of Jonah predicting the destruction of Ninevah and then God changes his mind? What do you make of the differences between the gospel of John and the synoptics (e.g., Christ’s mission is one year in the synoptics and three years in John)?

    Comment by Blake — March 23, 2005 @ 10:14 pm

51. Wow. Lots of stuff and I missed it all. A few brief thoughts.

    1. We ought distinguish between God knowing everything (what I think you mean by absolute omniscience) and simple foreknowledge. I’m not convinced Mormonism is committed to the former. I personally believe it entails the second, although clearly some disagree.

    2. Recall that knowledge is typically considered as justified true belief. (There are exceptions, but that’ll do for this discussion) That means for God to know anything about the future it must be absolutely true and therefore fixed. You can’t have predictions based upon something that could be otherwise in a strong sense and have knowledge. Anyone who says a fallible prediction is knowledge is misusing the term.

    3. The reason relativity is sometimes invoked is because General Relativity entails what is called substantial spacetime. That is, spacetime as a whole is a substance-like entity. It is a whole. Now some, like Blake, might simply say General Relativity is wrong. But if you buy General Relativity as being true, then the fixity of the future is a fact. I should add that most interpretations of General Relativity would also deny backwards causality, limiting what is known about the future via some direct perception.

    4. People in this thread are conflating the fixity of the future with fatalism. Fatalism is the doctrine that what I do doesn’t matter, the future will happen no matter what. This is not believed by those advocating foreknowledge. Fatalism would be something like saying that if you turn left or turn right at the intersection, you’ll still die. Fixity of the future would entail something like if you turn left you won’t die. If you turn right you will die. You chose to turn right.

    5. Realize that a lot of the debate is a semantic game over the meaning of the word “free” and how it relates to our typical language use and our intuitions. The people who believe the term should be at least extended to a wider meaning still believe in freedom and believe most of the same practical matters. The free will debate is primarily a philosophical one regarding language. It has possible implications if one language choice is “true.” But we ought keep in mind that it is primarily a linguistic issue. As someone mentioned, whether God does or doesn’t have foreknowledge and to what that might imply is entirely an empirical matter that I don’t think the scriptures really resolve one way or the other. (Although I think it fair to say that most General Authorities and scripture figures assume foreknowledge)

    Comment by Clark — March 23, 2005 @ 11:34 pm

52. Clark what are you still doing awake?
    I am personally under the conviction that God’s foreknowledge is not limited only by free will. This maybe making God a little too human.

    1) If information that any time at all to travel, then some information which has already happened in some places (maybe even here) might still be a prediction whereever He is. This is not just limited to the speed of light, but any speed whatsoever.

    2) Quantum mechanics suggests that though fluctuations will tend to cancel eachother out over the long run, this will not be the case in small areas over a small increment of time. Predictions, even those made by God, will involve probabilities. The uncertainty principle applies to God as well.

    3) Just because He can know something in the future, this doesn’t mean that he does know it. He simply might not have looked into the matter. I could know what temperature it is right now in DC, but I don’t look into the matter. Mostly because I don’t care enough. Such would not be the case with God and the Plan of Salvation.
    Thus, even though I am a determinist, I still believe God’s foreknowledge to be limited.

    Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 24, 2005 @ 1:11 am

53. I don’t understand all you compatibilist/determinist guys. How can you be a Mormon and a determinist/soft determinist at the same time? I mean I understand the Calvinist’s, and I think their TULIP doctrine is consistent with their belief in pre-destination. But for a Mormon to accept these idea’s is beyond me.
    Clark,
    You say that fatalism and “fixity of the future” are being conflated, and that they shouldn’t be. I agree that they are different. Fatalism is impersonal, and the “fixed future” is personal. I quote Clark Pinnock, “Fatalism and predestination are not the same thing–one is impersonal, the other personal–but they imply much the same thing for practical puruposes, i.e. the certainty of all future events.” How can a person be held responsible for thier actions, if their actions are determined? It seems that responsibility implies the ability to choose among genuine options. Clark is sounds like your a compatibilist. Compatibilits make less sense to me than determinists do. Actually determinists make perfect sense to me, I just can’t accept what they say. But Compatibilists on the other hand sound like thier trying to “have thier cake and eat it to”. Could you care to clear up how you reconsile responsibility with a determined world?

    Comment by Craig — March 24, 2005 @ 7:55 am

54. Good point, Blake (#50)

    I actually didn’t mean to imply that scripture is inerrant — obviously there are errors. I only meant to say my approach is to assume scriptures are innocent until proven guilty, or in other words I assume they are accurate unless the evidence is overwhelming thatthere is an error. That is why I am more comfortable the approach I took regarding the Peter case. As I’m sure you would agree, claiming the scriptures are in error too quickly is a very slippery slope so I try to avoid that card whenever possible.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 24, 2005 @ 9:42 am

55. Clark,

    Points 1-2: Yes. We are in some agreement here. I have been careful to focus on what I’ve called “absolute foreknowledge” as opposed to just foreknowledge. I suggested there is probably some form of “non-absolute-foreknowledge” to Steve in #37. Though since I think it is based on probabilities some may dispute calling it foreknowldege at all. But I think it is no stretch (and I think Blake has agreed with this) for God to know He can get his purposes accomplished. It is a stretch to say he knows exactly how, when, and where every detail of that will happen. (See my example to Don in #37)

    Point 4: I think I have also been careful to say that a fixed-future natually leads to fatalism (as opposed to saying they are exactly the same). Nevertheless it may be a moot clarification because as Craig points out the result is the same. If the future is fixed there is nothing we can do to change it. I think an open future is required in our doctrine.

    Jeffrey: Wow a real Mormon determinist! That is quite a stretch with our doctrines. You should write a post explaining how that works. Also, I obviously agree with your comment “The uncertainty principle applies to God as well.”

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 24, 2005 @ 11:20 am

56. Clark: Re: 50.3 I believe that you are mistaken that GR entails a fixed future. I address this issue in my book and Adolph Grunbaum has shown that such an assertion is mistaken. (See the discussion in my book).

    Jeff: Like Geoff, I would also like to see how you square determinism with basic LDS commitments to choices among alternatives and God not being resonsible for evil, etc.

    Comment by Blake — March 24, 2005 @ 11:32 am

57. Pre-destination only means something if somebody knows what that destiny is. Since I don’t believe that even God knows this, what’s the big deal? I simply believe that everything has a cause. (There is a quote by Brigham Young which says this very thing which I cannot find right now.) Thing don’t just happen. If that were true, that would be incompatible with Mormonism in my opinion. True, there are quantum fluctuations, like I said, but also like I said they tend to cancel each other out of the long haul. I should also mention that I am a soft-determinist.

    Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 24, 2005 @ 11:39 am

58. Here is that quote: JD 13:34
    “This is a great miracle in our estimation; but it would be no miracle at all to the Lord, because He knows precisely how to do it. There is no miracle to any being in the heavens or on the earth, only to the ignorant. To a man who understands the philosophy of all the phenomena that transpire, there is no such thing as a miracle. A great many think there are results without causes; there is no such thing in existence; there is a cause for every result that ever was or ever will be, and they are all in the providences and in the work of the Lord.”

    I am also very persuaded by L. Rex Sears paper on determinism from dialogue as well as Dennett’s Freedom Evolves.

    Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 24, 2005 @ 11:46 am

59. I still think this issue is more intuitive than logical. Blake, I know you will disagree with this, but really, there is no way to divide the issue logically. If there is a fixed future, and if there is still free will, we have no conception of what it means. We don’t know what it is like to know the future before it happens. We only know what we think it would be like to know the future before it happens, and it scares us because if we knew the future before it happens, we would try to change the bad things. In fact, we actually would be part of causing all of the bad thigns, so if we knew the future before it happened, then it wouldn’t be the future any more because we would do different things. In fact, if we knew the future before ithappened, I’m not sure God would have foreknowledge. Perhaps the only reason we can trust God with foreknowledge is that his actions are voluntarily restricted by the cat that everything he does will be in strict keeping with the furtherance of the salvation of his children. thus we already know what he will do, and his seeing the future before it happens will not cause him to do things differently, though it perhaps is his kowledge of the fuutre and his determination of the things he will do that cause that future that come to him simultaneously as a single intuition. Keep in mind that I don’t think that foreknwoedge is absolute even though I believe in simple foreknowledge so there is a time, perhaps even just an instant before he institues time as we know it for this to happen for him to realize what the course of his actions will be and what the resulting future will be because of it.
    Caveat–some of this is just new refining of my ideas, and it does not constitute my reasons for believing them.

    Comment by Steve H — March 24, 2005 @ 11:54 am

60. Jeffrey, it seems to me that in your (1) in #52 is trying to interpret relativity in terms of an absolute time that it inherently denies. When you say, “some information which has already happened in some places (maybe even here) might still be a prediction whereever He is.” So I’d say that way of conceiving things is a no-no. However you make a good point when you say this applies to any speed, thus avoiding the relativity point.

    Basically your argument is that God knows causally and that takes time. Thus there might be something true but unknown.

    My complaint is that I don’t see how this is really a problem unless one requires that at a minimum God know all that is true. Thus limiting his knowledge to normal causal influence seems wrong. That’s fine, but I’m not sure it’ll convince anyone who doesn’t already buy your premises. Further, I don’t think Blake’s argument typically depends upon how God knows.

    What you say about QM is true, and with respect to chaotic systems, I think macro-effects of God’s lack of knowledge will compound.

    Your (3) simply recognizes a distinction between the possibility of foreknowledge and awareness of foreknowledge. I tend to agree with you, but would merely point out that the whole awareness issue adds a perhaps unnecessary complication into the discussion. For instance do you know 2 + 2 = 4 even when you aren’t thinking about it? I think though for the sake of Blake’s arguments the mere potential for knowledge is sufficient.

    Comment by clark — March 24, 2005 @ 12:10 pm

61. Blake, I don’t buy your discussion of relativity in your book. Further, as I recall, you deal with SR and not GR. (I don’t have your book here at work so I can’t double check) It seems to me that all analysis of GR, as opposed to SR, recognize that there is a substantial spacetime.

    I may comment more on that point over at my blog, since any discussion will of necessity get complex.

    Craig, the reason I want to distinguish fatalism from the fixity of the future is that in one my choices matter while in the other they don’t. The problem is that you are begging the question by considering choices in a particular fashion.

    Also, for the record I’m not a determinist. A determinist is one who thinks that the current state of affairs plus the laws of physics entail a unique future state of affairs. I don’t believe that. I’m anti-determinist in that I don’t think the current state of affairs entails future states of affairs. However I do believe in the fixity of the future, up to a certain point. They are logically different positions.

    As I mentioned at my blog, I think Blake’s claim for limited foreknowledge is difficult to reconcile to his arguments. I think that they logically ential absolutely no foreknowledge.

    With regards to Blake’s question of reconciling choices between alternative to my view, I believe we can choose between alternatives. I simply don’t agree with your definition of what a choice is. As I see it the question is primarily logical. With regards to responsibility, I’m persuaded by semi-compatibilism to a point. But as I’ve said before, I think the responsibility argument is your strongest one.

    Comment by clark — March 24, 2005 @ 12:19 pm

62. Whoops. In that last paragraph it should read, “I see the question as primarily linguistical.”

    Comment by clark — March 24, 2005 @ 12:21 pm

63. Steve,
    I think your missing the point. It seems that you are assuming that God has exhaustive foreknowledge and then appealing to ignorance or mystery to prove your point. I’ll grant that sometimes appealing to mystery (as illogical as it is) is necessary. But what I want to know is, what makes you think that this is a case where we must suspend logic in order to make room for the dichotomy? Where do you get the assumption that God has exhaustive foreknowledge? Do you find it in scripture? How do you square this with scriptures that seem to contradict your theory? Do you feel that exhaustive foreknowledge is a “great making property”? Is God not worthy of our worship if he does not have exhaustive foreknowledge? These are the kinds of questions I would like you to answer. You keep appealing to mystery, and our limited knowledge and using that as a proof substitute for your theory. Why do you think it’s important for us to believe that God has exhaustive foreknowledge? What benefit would exhastive foreknowledge be to God? If he know’s the future absolutely can he do anything about what he sees? If he can, then what does it really mean to have exhaustive foreknowledge? I’m asking a lot of questions I know, but I just want to know where your coming from.

    Comment by Craig — March 24, 2005 @ 1:41 pm

64. Yes, there is a serious linguistic problem here, Clark. For instance you said: I think that they logically entail absolutely no foreknowledge. And in the strictest sense of the word foreknowledge you are right. I have tried to create a new category of meaning by calling the strictest sense “absolute foreknowledge” but calling the version bases on probabilities non-absolute-foreknowledge. But that leaves me open to criticism because of the following:

    If God knows there is only a 1 in a billon chance that something won’t go as He wants does he have foreknowledge of the event? In the strictest sense , no. In a practical sense yes. What is he has a backup plans that also has only a one in a billion chance of not going his way. Does he have foreknowledge yet? In the strictest sense, no; in a practical sense, yes. And what if he has a billion such backup plans? Will things go his way? Yes. Can we even then say he has absolute foreknowledge or foreknowledge in the strictest sense? No.

    That is the difference to me. Whatever we want to call it, I believe God will get the job done. But if we are actually free to choose then there is always that theoretical chance that things will go off track. (Now since God is eternal perhaps this process of backup plans could also theoretically go on for ever, but only theoretically — not practically).

    So if people object to this “one in a billion” model being called a variation of foreknowledge, what can we call it?

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 24, 2005 @ 1:41 pm

65. With respect to the arguments at hand, you can’t know something that is false. What you are really talking about is justified belief. That’s fine. The big question is what the probabilities mean and how many things are sufficiently probable so as to be justifiably believed. For instance, in 6000 BC, what was the probability that a bunch of Romans would choose crucifixion as their death sentence of choice?

    Comment by Clark — March 24, 2005 @ 3:14 pm

66. in 6000 BC, what was the probability that a bunch of Romans would choose crucifixion as their death sentence of choice?

    Apparently high enough for God to accurately predict it. Perhaps that is the problem… maybe people believe in absolute foreknowledge because they have trouble believing God has enough power and knowledge to manage and predict a world full of free people and an open future… If that is the case which camp really is limiting God?

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 24, 2005 @ 5:06 pm

67. Geoff,
    It seems like your approach to the Roman thing assumes that God is predicting from probability and that therefore the probability must have been high if he predicted it. I think Clark’s point is that there must have been a lot of individual choices that went into the making of this social practice. Thus there would have been innumerable chances for this prophecy to go awry, specific as it was. God predicted it accurately despite the cumulative improbability of lots of intervening choices, thus showing that he can predict low probability occurances as well as high-proability occurances.
    As relates to Craig’s questions about unfulfilled prophecy, I’m not so sure that I’ve seen specific examples that I trust as clearly something God predicted in good faith that didn’t happen. I know the Missouri temple thing keeps coming up, but I’m not sure as I read the verses that the prophecy means what it says on the surface. It does say that they should begin the building of the New Jerusalem. That is a commandment, not a prophecy. Then, in the middle of speaking of “this place,” he specifically qualifies himself saying that the place is not necessarily, at that point Missouri, but the temple, and that the temple of which he is speaking of as a gathering place would be built in that generation. In fact, in the next verse, he says that “an house of the Lord” will be raised “in this generation.” The use of an indefinite article here instead of an indicative pronoun (this temple) cwould seem to me that he is specifically being vague about what temple will be built after being specific about where they shoudl begin the work. I think the Lord knows the saints need to begin their work, even though they will fail. He knows, however, that they need the hope of better things and reveals to them that a temple will be built. Why, in fact, revela that there will be a temple built, when they are about to build a temple, unless you think there are going to be problems and the people will need hope? In fact, he later reassures his people in regards to their failure that when the wicked hinder them from obeying, he does not expect them to fulfill his commands. Seeing that there would be persecution against the church that would hinder them seems like one of those high probability events that god would foresee. I know this is only one instance, but I tend to look for ways that I might have misunderstood God rather than thinking that he was wrong.

    Comment by Steve H — March 24, 2005 @ 5:32 pm

68. Steve,
    I get the feeling that you think I (we) think God is somehow incompetent. That is not what we are arguing at all. To demonstarte what we are trying to make clear I will use the following scripture.

    32 Wo be unto the Gentiles, saith the Lord God of Hosts! For notwithstanding I shall lengthen out mine arm unto them from day to day, they will deny me; nevertheless, I will be merciful unto them, saith the Lord God, if they will repent and come unto me; for mine arm is lengthened out all the day long, saith the Lord God of Hosts.

    (Book of Mormon | 2 Nephi 28:32)

    The Lord makes it very clear that we will more than likely not repent, but that if we repent he will be merciful. Most scriptures and most prophecies have this sort of conditionality about them. We use the Jackson Country Temple only as a recent example of how God deals with an open future. But the scriptures are replete with these sort of examples. Granted, not all proephecy like this, there are unique occasions where the Lord makes it clear that the prophecy will be fulfilled. For example in the same chapter I just quoted from and as a contrast to the passage I just quoted Nephi prophecies what must come to pass.

    18 But behold, that great and abominable church, the whore of all the earth, must tumble to the earth, and great must be the fall thereof.
    19 For the kingdom of the devil must shake, and they which belong to it must needs be stirred up unto repentance, or the devil will grasp them with his everlasting chains, and they be stirred up to anger, and perish;

    (Book of Mormon | 2 Nephi 28:18 - 19)

    Why would Nephi make it clear that this propesy must happen, if it is already implied within a prophecy that it must come to pass? Even in this passage a conditional prophecy is given in the which Nephi does not use the langauge of necessity. He say’s that those who belong to the church that must fall need to be stirred up unto repentance or we will perish. I think the reason that the Lord knows that the Church of the Devil will fall is both because God will be the cause and such an instution will fall by necessity. This sort of prophecy God has no need to doubt the fulfillment of.

    So we are not saying that God is incompetent, or that God is always getting things wrong, what we’re saying is God is inherently limited in what he can and can’t know. This is especially true when it comes to out ability to choose, our choices at times will be random, and God will not be able to predict this randomness, no matter how well he knows us. God has general knowledge of the future, given his experience and his amazing intellectual insight, but he does not have knowledge of that which cannot be known.

    Comment by Craig — March 24, 2005 @ 6:35 pm

69. Clark: in 6000 BC, what was the probability that a bunch of Romans would choose crucifixion as their death sentence of choice?

    Geoff:Apparently high enough for God to accurately predict it.

    Now *thats* a question begging response if I ever saw one. (grin) The point is that given free will, it seems highly difficult to believe that it was high enough for God to predict it. (Which would have to be more than 50% at a minimum)

    Comment by Clark — March 24, 2005 @ 7:12 pm

70. To add to Steve’s comments about prophesy, there is also the issue that divine inspiration is rarely dictated by God. There is always a fallible receiver involved. Why assume a prophecy was erroneously predicted? Why not assume we misunderstood. I can think of many examples from my own life where I had inspiration, interpreted it one way, recorded in one way, and then a few days later realized I was wrong in how I’d interpreted it.

    Comment by Clark — March 24, 2005 @ 7:15 pm

71. What makes anyone believe that it was predicted in 6000 B.C. that a bunch of Romans would crucify Christ? Could you point me to that prophecy? It seems to me that Jesus’s mere presence was known to be enough provocation that those who rejected his message would seek his death — and his actions (like cleansing the temple and calling the Pharisees hypocrites, etc.) were very likely to provoke such a reaction. I just don’t see a problem here since it is God’s action that (nonculpably) provoked the response.

    Comment by Blake — March 24, 2005 @ 7:30 pm

72. Craig,
    I have no problem with the fact that God often offers prophecy as contingent. I believe this is necessary to ensure that we do not take a fatalistic view in many cases. He must ensure our agency by keeping the future hidden from us. In fact, as I said above, this might be necessary to his forekowlege, though I’m not married to the idea.
    I have been asked, however, to explain scriptures that claim that the future will be one thing and then something else happens. Looking back, I see that Jeffrey was the one who most directly addressed this, but the Missouri thing has come up a couple of times. If you are simply saying that God offers a lot of contingent prophecies, then I’m OK with that. I think that’s necessary. People need to be called to repentance even if they won’t listen because otherwise they haven’t been tried, and they don’t grow through that trial. If, on the other hand we are saying that god says things will happen and they don’t happen because occasionally he’s wrong, then if that is correct, I have some ’splainin’ to do. I guess the question is who really needs to explain a phenomenon. Is it the simple foreknowledge camp that must explain unfulfilled prophecy or the limited foreknowledge camp that must explain the fullfillment of certian very specific prophecies(as in the writing fulfillment back into prophecy theory)? I tend to think the latter, since I don’t really see unfulfilled prophecies.

    Comment by Steve H — March 24, 2005 @ 7:31 pm

73. Clark: The point is that given free will, it seems highly difficult to believe that it was high enough for God to predict it.

    Ah, but that is the very point. It may seem difficult to believe that God could do so, but it is not logically impossible. As Blake so ably pointed out in his book, it is logically impossible for absolute foreknowledge (with the fixed future it entails) and free agency to be compatible.

    Like many things God does, I don’t know how he does it. But despite Blake’s good point about the made up 6000 B.C. scenario, I’ll take a swipe at my theory of how he might do it later tonight in a follow-up comment.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 24, 2005 @ 9:34 pm

74. Steve: Look again at your view. Let’s assume that you are right and God knows the future and we are somehow free because we don’t. It still follows that God is powerless to change what he knows will be the case and cannot use his knowledge for any purpose other than to just know it. It also follows immediately that God isn’t free precisely because he knows — and you are compelled to admit this conclusion because you have concluded that humans would not be free if they had such knowledge. Do you believe that God is not free?

    Further, if you are a determinist, could you explain for me how we are morally responsible since we literally cannot do anything other than what we do?

    As for the scriptures — no unfulfilled prophcies? What would count as an unfulfilled prophecy for you if God’s saying one thing will happen and then it doesn’t happen doesn’t count? Or if he says he intends to do X and then later says he is revoking X and will bring about Y instead? You must have a very different notion of what counts as an unfulfilled prophecy than most people.

    Just what are the specific prophecies that are incompatible with libertarian free will to which you allude? To be incompatible with free will a prophecy would have to be so precise that it specifies who will do what at a precise moment. For example, if it is predicted that Peter will deny Christ three times, that still is not precise enough since there were always alternatives open to Peter at any given moment. If he could choose when to deny Christ he is still free even if the number of times that he will do it in a 14 hour period is 3. If the prophecy is that Peter will me deny me at T1, T2 and T3, then we have a problem. So you’re going to have to give me an example of a prophecy precise enough to be incompatible with free will — and forekowledge is always incompatible with free will because it includes knowledge not merely of what will be done but precisely when it will be done as well.

    Moreover, I challenge you all to come with just one genuine instance where a prophecy is specific enough to be incompatible with free will and also to be documented to have been given before the event prophecies occurred. All of the prophecies in the NT (and for that matter the OT) were reduced to writing long after the events described — and given human nature were likely fleshed out and made more precise in light of the fulfillment of the prophecy. For example, the prophecy that the Book of Mormon plates would be given to a learned man and he would say “I cannot translate a seal book,” is recognized as a prophecy only because the events gave meaning to the earlier words — and there have been multiple fulfillments of Isaiah 29. So can anyone identify a prophecy known to have been reduced to writing before its fulfillment that is precise enough to conflict with LFW?

    Comment by Blake — March 24, 2005 @ 9:49 pm

75. Clark, with regards to my use of relativity, I was referring to the concept of a “light cone” though in this context it would be an information cone. Scientists still speak quite forcefully on their conceptual existence, so I don’t know if maybe I am missing why it is such a no-no. As to determinism being the belief in 1 set future, I say so what? There is only 1 future, namely the one we will all be sharing in the next minute or so. I don’t think anybody has claimed to have experience two futures or two pasts or two presents. I have no problem believing in 1 set future just so long as nobody 1) know EVERYTHING about it, not even God, and 2) is totally responsible for it, again, not even God. I think those conditions are met quite easily in Mormon doctrine.

    Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 24, 2005 @ 10:08 pm

76. I think that the most impressive prophecy given by JS was probably the civil war prophecy. It was definitely given and recorded before hand, and we all know the fulfillment very well. The two match up very, very well, but not perfectly. The war was not the commencement of a world war. The prophecy was true, but not totally true.

    This, I think, fits in well with my idea of God’s foreknowledge. By the time the prophecy was given movements had been sufficiently locked in motion, not by God but by the trends of the time, for God to make a prediction which was far more accurate than man could do on their own. But even then, it was not perfect.

    Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 24, 2005 @ 10:13 pm

77. Jeff: Now you must show that the civil war prophecy has any elements precise enough to conflict with LFW. The easy answer is that there is nothing there precise enough to confict with LFW. It deosn’t pedict any individual acts at all. Heck, it is possible to argue in good faith that it wasn’t even all fulfilled. With all due respect, this prophecy is rather vague and it is difficult to determine precisely what events were supposed to fulfill it. Further, as you admit, by the time the prophecy was given the war between the states and that it would commence in South Carolina were easily predictable even by humans given the existing course of events(since others mere humans in fact did so predict in JS’s own life-time). So it seems to me that God could easily predict such a war given existing probabilities. Moreover, how was war “then” poured out on all nations as a result of the civil war “beginning at this place” (i.e, beginning in Sourth Carolina)? This seems to be a part of the prophecy that didn’t occur.

    Comment by Blake — March 24, 2005 @ 10:51 pm

78. Blake,
    Read #59 really quick if you haven’t. I think it describes one way that God could use foreknowledge. I’m not sure it’s the only possible explanation, but I’m liking it right now. Once things are in motion, I don’t really think God is all that free. God would cease to be God if he did anything that was not for the good of his children, and this obligates him in each situation to do precisely that which will tend towards the salvation of each of his children in each instance. That’s how I take D&C 82:10. That is to say our actions determine the actions God must take as God.
    As far as being a determinist, I really don’t see myself as a determinist.
    As far as prophecy being incompatible with free will, I don’t think any prophecy is. You forget that I really believe we do have free will despite precise foreknowledge.
    The peter thing, I don’t see the significance of knowing when we will do what we do. The big question, it would seem to me is if God knows who will be saved. If he knows that we will do things that will keep us from salvation, does it matter when?
    BTW, I know nothing about you, even though we write back and forth like this a lot lately here and on SS. Is there somewhere online with any info about you, or you could leave some here or my e-mail is on Splendid Sun, I think. Also, I’m glad you picked up Steve. When I’m not teaching, Brother Hancock is odd.

    Comment by Steve H — March 24, 2005 @ 10:55 pm

79. Steve and Clark and other absolute foreknowledge fans,

    Forgive me if I throw out another riot-inciting comment here… But I have given some thought to he point I made in #73. My question is why would someone after serious thought choose a logically impossible answer over a logically possible answer? The logically possible solution seems like the only choice to me. Is the problem that you don’t believe God is intelligent or insightful enough to make predictions about an open future? It seems this idea of absolute foreknowledge could be used as a crutch — like magic or something — to avoid having to believe God could accomplish a seemingly herculean task. Do you think God resorts to logically impossible measures to do things like walk on water? That is not what Brigham taught. (See #58) Brigham just said God had logical knowledge that allowed him to do what appear to be miracles to us.

    Note that Brigham is not talking about paradoxes here but things we don’t yet have the science to figure out yet. No amount of science will answer the question of whether an omnipotent being can create a rock too heavy to pick up. I propose that the problem of absolute foreknowledge and free will is in that same paradoxical category. Why lean on a paradox when we can marvel at the intelligence and power of a God who can do things (like make shockingly accurate, though occasionally not-so-accurate, predictions of an open future) that seem extremely difficult to pull off?

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 25, 2005 @ 12:20 am

80. Blake, I was trying to show how the most impressive example that we can find of prophecy coming true is still shows that foreknowledge is limited. I was agreeing with you, but I guess I didn’t make myself clear.

    Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 25, 2005 @ 12:50 am

81. Geoff,
    It’s not a question of leaning on a crutch. (Not that I have any problem with crutches if my leg happens ot be broken. There are actually three reasons I believe this.
    1. I see it as logically more tenable that free will and foreknowledge are compatible than that God makes predictions of what we will do with free will that, over time would have less than a 50% chance of being correct. If you base it on probability, how could God’s chance of predicting the event be more accurate than the probability that the event will take place? This would seem to be illogical.
    2. I see it as necessary for providence. New argument for this, though my main ones are those about providing big things like the atonement–you have argued that god just has contingency plans. Lets say that to provide for necessity X, God has to prepare Y now. Lets also say that whether I will be provided for by providential attempt X sub 1 is based on my exercise of freewill between now and when the providence is granted. God would have to know what I am going to do to know whether to prepare to give me X through attempt X sub 1.
    3. As I read the scriptures they seem to teach foreknowledge. In the long run, I know this is an exegetical nightmare. It involves so many interpretations of so many different scriptures that it’s tough to come to agreement on them.
    Part of the problem is almost certainly sematic as well. What do we mean by logic. If we mean the methods of analytic philosophy in the western tradition, I think some things may be illogical about the way god works. If we mean that something follows the rules of the universe, were we to understand them, then nothing is.

    Comment by Steve H — March 25, 2005 @ 12:54 am

82. Jeffrey,

    It sounds like you are not a real determinist. If you are you believe that all of our actions and choices are really reactions to causes that are outside of us. This means that the first cause (presumably God) is really the one who is morally responsible for all human acts. This is obviously a doctrine that is completely at odds with Mormon doctrine.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 25, 2005 @ 1:00 am

83. The latest addition to my theory of God’s method to predict an open future:
    OK, so determinists say all of our actions are really reactions. As a businessman by trade I’ve read more business books than philosophy books and the action vs reaction thing reminds me of the “be proactive” habit in Covey’s Seven Habits book. In that book Covey tells of a great “Ah-Ha” moment he had when he realized that there is always a space between stimulus and response in which humans can choose. He goes into great detail of how this is vital to our power as humans. It mirrors our scriptures that talk about our power to act and the fact that we would be acted upon in our lives. These scriptures recommend we do more acting and get acted upon less and Covey recommend the same thing. In fact his habit #1 is called “be proactive” as opposed to reactive. It focuses our attention on our unique, god-given ability to act rather than be acted upon.

    It would not be necessary for him to teach this habit if it were a natural thing that everyone already did. The fact is most people are almost purely reactive. For the most part we are predictable. The determinists almost have it right. The difference in my opinion is that when we are “proactive” we exercise our god-like freedom to choose and become a mini “first cause” ourselves. So like Jeffrey mentions, everything has a cause, but unlike determinist doctrines I believe some things are caused directly by our own proactive wills.

    So how does this help God predict the future? Because when people always react causal determinism is true. When they act naturally then they are totally predictable. And unfortunately we are very rarely godlike in our natural reactions. This is the very reason why the natural man is an enemy to God. God doesn’t want us to react to everything naturally. He wants us to proactively be like him. When we get cut off on the freeway he wants us to choose our response to that stimulus and proactively not flip the bozo off.

    Because most of humankind does not ever shed the natural man, general predictions of the future seem pretty straight forward — much like the determinists believe. But because some people act rather than react, exact foreknowledge based on determinism is not possible. (This sounds very much like the uncertainty principle to me too. The group is always predictable but the individual is not.)

    Anyway, that partial usage of determinism seems to make long term predictions not too difficult to me. As I said, I don’t know how God does it, but this theory sounds like a pretty feasible one to me.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 25, 2005 @ 1:09 am

84. Steve,
    Excuse me for saying, but those sound like poor reasons for believing in exhuastive foreknowledge. And I think that is the way we should be saying it…”exhuastive foreknowledge”. We’re not arguing here whether god has foreknowledge or not, so to say that the scriptures teach foreknowledge is not a reason in your favor. You are arguing “exhaustive foreknowledge”.

    You say,
    1. I see it as logically more tenable that free will and foreknowledge are compatible than that God makes predictions of what we will do with free will that, over time would have less than a 50% chance of being correct. If you base it on probability, how could God’s chance of predicting the event be more accurate than the probability that the event will take place? This would seem to be illogical.

    We are not saying the chances are less than 50%. What we’re saying is, most of the time God’s prophecy’s are so vague that they can be fulfilled in a number of ways. Other’s are very probable, but given the actions of free agents, they don’t come to complete fruition. And I’m not following how you argument as to how you think our position is illogical. It seem’s you’ve set up a “straw man” at best.

    You say,
    2. I see it as necessary for providence. New argument for this, though my main ones are those about providing big things like the atonement-you have argued that god just has contingency plans. Lets say that to provide for necessity X, God has to prepare Y now. Lets also say that whether I will be provided for by providential attempt X sub 1 is based on my exercise of freewill between now and when the providence is granted. God would have to know what I am going to do to know whether to prepare to give me X through attempt X sub 1.

    Your assuming that God can only succeed with his plans if you as a free agent cooperate. This is simply is not true. Yes God may give you second chances and try to get you to see things his way, but he is not going to lay an infinite amount of back up plans to save you. Your salvation is to yourself. God’s so called “back up plans” as argued on here are plans that God has layed out for future contingencies that we halt his larger work, not the work that depends on a single individual. For example his work at bringing the book of mormon, in it’s fulness to fruition. God’s providence does not include all of his plans being brought to fruition. As William James says, he is the great chess player, and we as free agents are the novices. Even though he cannot predict our movements, he knows how to counter each of these movements and win the game in the end. This does not require exhuastive foreknowledge of future events.

    You say,
    3. As I read the scriptures they seem to teach foreknowledge. In the long run, I know this is an exegetical nightmare. It involves so many interpretations of so many different scriptures that it’s tough to come to agreement on them.
    Part of the problem is almost certainly sematic as well. What do we mean by logic. If we mean the methods of analytic philosophy in the western tradition, I think some things may be illogical about the way god works. If we mean that something follows the rules of the universe, were we to understand them, then nothing is.

    Yes when I read the scriputures I read about foreknowledge as well, but nowhere do I read about exhaustive foreknowledge. I read completely the opposite. An impressively insightful God who knows a great deal about the future, but is a temporal God, with a body, who can only anticipate the future that is still open for free agents to act in. I don’t think we’re talking about the rules of the universe, unless you include logic in the rules of the universe. If you want to throw logic out, then what are you doing arguing? Anytime we debate one another, we do so with the presupposition that we will be speaking the same language…logic. If you have a better way to communicate let us know.

    Comment by Craig — March 25, 2005 @ 5:35 am

85. Geoff: “It is difficult to believe that God could do so, but it is not logically impossible. As Blake so ably pointed out in his book, it is logically impossible for absolute foreknowledge (with the fixed future it entails) and free agency to be compatible.”

    Fair enough, although turn about is fair play. It is likewise not logically impossible that Blake’s definition of free will isn’t correct or is applied to phenomena inappropriately. Just as scientific terms and common vernacular terms that are the same have different meanings and different areas they are appropriate, I think the same applies to many of the terms in the free will debate. Thus my long held assertion that all of this is really a linguistic dispute and not really the ontological dispute it appears to be.

    Jeffrey: “Clark, with regards to my use of relativity, I was referring to the concept of a “light cone” though in this context it would be an information cone. Scientists still speak quite forcefully on their conceptual existence, so I don’t know if maybe I am missing why it is such a no-no.”

    That’s a good question and if I have time I’ll respond tonight. I was going to go down to Moab, but the weather doesn’t appear to be cooperating. So I’ll put something together later.

    Geoff: “Steve and Clark and other absolute foreknowledge fans”

    I think I’ve been very clear that I don’t espouse absolute foreknowledge. Indeed I think the appeal to absolute foreknowledge is a bit of a red herring that tends to be misleading. The issue ought be whether any real foreknowledge is available. (Recognizing that Blake uses the term knowledge with respect to future events, but it isn’t really knowledge in the usual sense of the term)

    Geofff: “My question is why would someone after serious thought choose a logically impossible answer over a logically possible answer?”

    Obviously they wouldn’t. Which ought be a clue that perhaps you’re misunderstanding the alternative perspective. (grin)

    Comment by Clark — March 25, 2005 @ 10:33 am

86. Whoops, too many double negatives in that first response to Geoff. Put simply, Blake is asserting a meaning and range for “free” that might be wrong. You are all assuming his use is correct. (Yet everyone simultaneously seems quite willing to let him redefine knowledge)

    Comment by Clark — March 25, 2005 @ 10:34 am

87. Geoff, I disagree with your assessment of determinism.

    “You believe that all of our actions and choices are really reactions to causes that are outside of us. This means that the first cause (presumably God) is really the one who is morally responsible for all human acts.”

    This critique only applies when we frame determinism in the context of ethical monotheism, a context which Mormonism regects. As I said in #8, there is beginning to elements, intelligences or laws and I would add causes. It also depends on how you define “us.” Of course we can say that the ultimate causes are outside “us”, but there is no such thing as an ultimate cause. Causes for my actions come from both outside of “me” and inside, and these causes are caused by other things and so on. The real issue, I believe, surrounds responsibility.

    Since this is a fairly complex theme, and there doesn’t seem to have been to much written about it in the bloggernacle, I think I will dedicate a number of posts at my site to the subject.

    Comment by Jeffrey Giliam — March 25, 2005 @ 10:53 am

88. Clark,

    Sorry about lumping you in with others on this. I forgot you have nuanced belief on this subject. With regard to Blake redefining knowledge, I asked in #64 if there is a new or better way of describing this predictive version of “foreknowledge”, which as you have continually pointed out isn’t really knowledge at all. You aren’t letting me get away with calling it “foreknowledge” as opposed to “absolute foreknowledge”, so do you (or does anyone else) have an idea of what we should call it?

    And maybe this whole debate really is a linguistic problem as you state, but I’ve yet to really understand what you mean with that argument. Perhaps it is something like my middle ground explanation in #83 where I opine that neither pole (the free will camp or the determinism camp) is completely right but maybe we live in a world where most things are caused/determined by outside forces and a few things are caused/determined by human free will?

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 25, 2005 @ 11:15 am

89. Response to Clark re: #85 - Clark, mermaids are logically possible, so suggesting that it is logically possible that I am wrong (which of course is true) is not asserting much. What you must show is that the notion of free will which I adopt is either incoherent or not necessary for the kinds of things we want: like moral responsibility, self-determination, the ability to freely choose to love and accept love, and God’s not being responsible for sin and evil. I believe that LFW is immediately implicated in the ability to choose — and specifically the ability to choose among alternatives specified in the scripture of good and evil, life and death.

    Comment by Blake — March 25, 2005 @ 11:15 am

90. Jeffrey,

    I think we agree on how this works. See my #83 where I describe a world very similar to what you just said. My only point in #82 is that our shared belief put us at odds with the determinist camp because we also believe our free will can be a cause. Traditional determinism seems to reject the allowance of free will as such. As I understand it, even compatibilists reject our notion of determinism and actual free choices co-existing. They tend to focus on hypothetical free-will, which means even though our choices are determined we had the hypothetical option to choose otherwise (even though we never would).

    So it seems that you and I don’t currently fit in with the free-will crowds, the determinists, or the compatibilists.

    (Note: For those reading along who are up on all these terms check out the links I provided. They have been very educational to me as someone who never studied philosophy in college)

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 25, 2005 @ 11:34 am

91. Geoff, the reason I bring up the issue of the term ‘knowledge’ is because the issue really is reconciling terms with scriptural use. My point is if we allow God’s knowledge to really be this other kind of ‘knowledge’ then why can’t we do the same to the use of the term free?

    Do you see the issue?

    What is going on is the privileging of one term, in its modern intuitive view, over an other term.

    As to what to call this other sense Blake is calling knowledge, I’d prefer predictive power and assurance.

    Blake, I don’t consider mermaids logically possible in a fashion compatible with our world.

    Comment by Clark — March 25, 2005 @ 12:48 pm

92. Clark, Yes I see that double standard you point out. I can buy using something like “predictive power and assurance” in place of “foreknowledge”.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — March 25, 2005 @ 1:09 pm

93. I believe that LFW is immediately implicated in the ability to choose-and specifically the ability to choose among alternatives specified in the scripture of good and evil, life and death.
    I do as well.
    If you want to throw logic out, then what are you doing arguing?
    I am not throwing logic out. I am simply saying that we must understand when we encounter situations that limit the effectiveness of logical analysis, much as we might when you point out the old “rock too big” argument. I am simply saying that all Blake’s arguemnt proves, if it proves anything, is that we cannot understand how God could know something that, from our perspective is not happened yet. Because of our perspective only those things that have happened are actual. Therefore to say that foreknowledge is impossible because we can’t understand how God could know things that are not yet actual is like saying there can be no foreknowledge because it is foreknwoledge, which, certainly, leaves us trying to defend a position like your amazing predictive power. That is, there would be, as Clark points out, no real foreknowledge at all. When I say that I see the scriptures teaching foreknowledge, and I know I interpret scriptures like D&C 130 differently than Blake does, so I’ll not go through that again, I see them as teaching actual foreknowledge. I see quite a few times when God seems to have been anticipating very specific events well before-hand, and as I read, I am persuaded as I read, and as I live my life, that there is some sort of actual foreknowledge, so I am willing to admit that I do not know how God could know the things I will do, though they are not yet actual from my perspective. I don’t think this implies getting rid of logic. In fact it is my inability to comprehend the subject from any particular angle through logic that convinces me that there are things involved that logic cannot cover. So you might say that I feel I have logically come to the conclusion that foreknowledge is not entirely knowable through what we might call logic.

    Comment by Steve H — March 25, 2005 @ 3:28 pm

94. Steve, I don’t think “all that Blake’s argument shows is that we cannot understand how God could know something that from our perspective [has] not happened yet.” Blake’s argument doesn’t in the least depend upon the how at all.

    Comment by Clark — March 25, 2005 @ 3:51 pm

95. Clark: Logical possiblity has nothing to do with what is pragmatically or physically possible in our world — it is a matter of internal coherence alone. I don’t believe that mermaids are physically possible either — but that is quite beside the point that I was making.

    I don’t buy your suggestion that we cannot say that God has “foreknowledge.” He has certain knowledge of a great many things that are future. He knows that the details of his plan will occur. He knows whatever is now physically determined (and that could be a great many things like all of the earth’s physical events that don’t involve free will). He knows the present probability of any particular event’s occurring including our free acts given our character and propensities to act. That is a much vaster knowledge than we have and it fully accounts for what we find in scripture in my view. He also knows that he is omni-resourceful.

    Comment by Blake — March 25, 2005 @ 5:54 pm

96. It seems to me that it is time to address the issue with which Geoff really started — that prayer is pointless if God foreknows the future. If he foreknows the future exhaustively and absolutely, then nothing we ask can possibly change what God has already seen will be the case. As I show in my book, the view that a part of what God sees are his own free acts involves a vicious circularity that renders that explanation incoherent. The point is that such practices as petitionary prayer are crippled if we come to God believing that he already knows every word we will utter and his course is already set for him in response to the prayer before he can decide anything. Further, there is no chance for genuine dialolgue since it amounts to a contrived “going through the motions” to do what is already fated (and I used the word fated advisedly). There is no possibility of genuine dialogue and relationship if God has absolute and exhaustive foreknowledge — and that entails that what we value most is destroyed by such a belief.

    Comment by Blake — March 25, 2005 @ 5:59 pm

97. Thanks for bringing the original point back up Blake. Some readers may wonder why this foreknowledge subject even matters… This issue about petitionary prayer is the reason. J. Stapley pointed out in a post today that people can believe false things and still have faith in Christ. That is fine, but the point is that they only have faith in spite of false beliefs. (I firmly believe that God in his grace covers for those who haven’t had opportunity to learn better yet.) This false (IMO) doctrine of absolute or exhaustive foreknowledge won’t help anyone’s faith, though they may be able to continue to ignore the issue and have faith in Christ in spite of it.

    I wrote this post because I have seen in my own life (recently in fact) examples of otherwise faithful saints who could not generate miracle-working faith in their own lives because they had this nagging/overwhelming feeling in the back of their minds that God’s will is fixed and so is the future so praying to change that was futile. Why wouldn’t they think that is the case with so many people in and out of the church teaching this false doctrine and talking about how we can’t change God’s plans/will but can only ask to align our desires with his already determined plans and will? Despite what some have said here, for many saints this doctrine is faith-crippling. For that reason I am unapologetic for calling it pernicious.

    That’s not to say Steve and Clark and others have not made some good points though. I will write a follow up post fleshing out my ideas of how God might accurately predict the distant future without actually seeing it as a fixed reality.

    Comment by Geoff